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Foreword 
In this Newport Paper, Frank G. Goldman questions the adequacy of 
traditional nonproliferation strategies to deter the spread of nuclear weapons. 
While the subject is sensitive and the proposed solution perhaps radical, Mr. 
Goldman's argument is one that merits discussion. He examines counter-pro­
liferation as an alternative, supplemental strategy-a potentially valuable 
approach which the nation should not dismiss. Acknowledging the severe 
obstacles in the way of its employment, he contends that counter-proliferation 
offers a way to fill an important policy void. 
Mr. Goldman's careful and responsible exploration of the international 
legal aspects of counter-proliferation makes this work especially valuable. 
Its publication should stimulate productive thought and generate insight 
on a su bj ect vi tal to the securi ty communi ty, precisely the goals of the Naval 
War College's Newport Papers . 
. R. S ark 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy 
President, Naval War College 
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Counter-Proliferation: Reconsidering the Traditional 
U.S. Approach to Nuclear Nonproliferation 
F
OR NEARLY THREE DECADES the United States, in cooperation with 
many nations, has sought to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. The premise of this endeavor has been that this nation, its allies, 
and the entire international community are most stable when as few states 
as possible possess these weapons. By and large, nonproliferation efforts 
have proved successful inasmuch as only a handful of states
l 
have devel­
oped a nuclear capability since the signing of the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NYf). 2 The Clinton administration, as its prede­
cessors, has promised to maintain this commitment. In a 1993 address to 
the United Nations, President Bill Clinton announced his intention to 
make nonproliferation a priority of the administration.
3 
He reiterated this 
commitment to the nonfroliferation regime and the NPT in a foreign policy 
address in March 1995. 
However, with the conclusion of the Cold War and the dismantling of 
the political foundation that it provided, questions have surfaced about the 
continued viability of this "nonproliferation regime." Given the changes 
in the international political order, can the traditional nonproliferation 
strategies succeed? What alternatives or supplements to these traditional 
strategies may the United States and the world community implement as 
they attempt to fortify the nonproliferation regime? This paper explores 
the international legal ramifications of one suggested supplemental strat­
egy: counter-proliferation. 
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Counter-proliferation may be defined as measures ranging from eco­
nomic embargoes to military intervention designed to inhibit, restrain, or 
destroy the nuclear development programs of a potential proliferant.
5 
These methods include passive measures such as export controls designed 
to delay the weapons design program of a potential proliferant. They also 
may include more aggressive techniques such as the surreptitious intro­
duction of computer viruses designed to disrupt the proliferant's comput­
ing capacity. Most dramatically, counter-proliferation efforts include the 
use of military force against those nations or groups devoted to the devel­
opment of a nuclear weapon. This study addresses all of these matters but 
focuses on this last, most aggressive form of counter-proliferation. 
The traditional nonproliferation regime concentrates on inspections 
and the accounting of fissionable material by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) in addition to the use of unilateral and multilateral 
export controls which are designed to limit the unregulated spread of 
nuclear materials. The traditional regime also relies upon the commit­
ments of nonnuclear states, pursuant to the NPT, to forego the construction 
of nuclear weapons.
6 
In contrast to these relatively passive forms of non­
proliferation, which require the cooperation of the nonnuclear states, 
counter-proliferation measures, if implemented, would be designed to 
prohibit directly the acquisition, development, manufacture, testing, and 
deployment of a nuclear weapon by the potential proliferant. 
A strategy of counter-proliferation would break with traditional U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts by aggressively seeking to prevent the develop­
ment of nuclear weapons. U.S. policy makers currently are studying this 
strategy as an alternative or supplement to the present reliance on the 
traditional regime? The U.S. Department of Defense, through its Counter­
Proliferation Initiative, is exploring what role counter-proliferation strate­
gies and tactics will play in post-Cold War U.S. defense policy.
8 
This study posi ts a three-part thesis. First, after an analysis of the current 
tenets of international law, the study argues that a unilateral U.S. applica­
tion of an aggressive counter-proliferation strategy is inconsistent with 
current norms of international law. Second, despite this inconsistency, 
policy makers in the United States should not abandon the counter-prolif­
eration strategy, because an occasion may arise when the United States will 
be unable to tolerate the imminent development of a nuclear weapon by an 
adversary with goals adverse to the vital interests of this nation. Third, 
however, the study contends that U.S. policy makers should not attempt 
to mold international law through diplomacy so that counter-proliferation 
2 
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becomes normatively acceptable throughout the international community. 
While such an endeavor is attractive at first blush, such a strategy, if 
successful, would be counterproductive to V.S. interests because it would 
permi t nations other than the V ni ted States to legi timately launch counter­
proliferation attacks, perhaps even against V.S. allies. While unilateral 
counter-proliferation efforts risk the condemnation of the international 
community, any attempt to legitimize counter-preliferation internation­
ally might provide other states with the type of political cover needed to 




The Traditional U.S. Approach to Nonproliferation 
B
EFORE COMMENCING a detailed examination of counter-prolifera­
tion, this paper must explain the workings of the traditional U.S. 
approach to nonproliferation and why this strategy, standing alone, may 
no longer be viable. 
U.S. Reliance on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) 
Two prongs comprise the traditional American approach to nonprolif­
eration. The first relies on the NPT to ensure that signatory nations do not 
develop nuclear warheads. Nonnuclear states that submit to the NPT 
promise to forego the development of nuclear weapons.
9 
In exchange for 
this commitment, the nuclear states promise not to transfer nuclear 
weapons or assist other states in the manufacture of these weapons.
lO 
The 
NPT also requires that parties submit to IAEA safeguards,ll which take an 
accounting of the fissionable material possessed by each nonnuclear signa­
tory state. The IAEA's task is to confirm that these states have not diverted 
fissionable material to a weapons development program. 
Generally, the NPf has been successful in achieving its goal that nonnu­
clear states will not clandestinely develop nuclear warheads. However, the 
record of the NPT regime has not been flawless. First, a few nations have 
not signed the Treaty and thus are outside its purview. India, which 
exploded a "nuclear device" in 1974, and Israel, which reportedly possesses 
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a small nuclear arsenal, have not signed the Treaty. Moreover, some states 
that have signed and ratified the NPT have resisted its provisions. Iraq 
clandestinely pursued a weapons development program during the 1980s. 
The IAEA only discovered the extent of this program in the aftermath of 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iran, another NPT signatory, also has pursued 
a nuclear capability. 12 Most recently, North Korea has proven reluctant to 
abide by its NPT commitments, having prevented IAEA inspectors from 
thoroughly examining North Korean nuclear facilities to ensure that the 
North Koreans are not diverting fissionable material to a weapons devel­
opment program. The United States, South Korea, and North Korea 
negotiated a framework to resolve this issue in October 1994. This agree­
ment provided that North Korea would curtail its nuclear program in 
exchange for a $4 billion light-water nuclear reactor. The Korean Penin­
sula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), comprised of repre­
sentatives from the United States, South Korea and Japan, was established 
to iron out the details of this agreement. Since its founding in March 1995, 
KEDO has grown to nine members, including Australia, New Zealand, 
Finland, Canada, Indonesia and Chile. Since its inception, KEDO has 
received over $87 million from its members, including $31.5 million from 
the United States Y 
In May 1995, the international community extended the NPT indefi­
nitely. This extension represents a constructive development for the cur­
rent nonproliferation regime. President Clinton noted that the indefinite 
extension "testifies to a deep and abiding international commitment to 
confront the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.,,
14 
While the NPT exten­
sion reinforces the current nonproliferation regime, the treaty's ability to 
contain the spread of nuclear weapons still is uncertain. Several nations 
remain outside its scope, most notably India and Israel. Several other states 
have skirted its provisions. Consequently, while the NPT is an important 
element in the international community's endeavors to control the spread 
of proliferation, it can not and will not guarantee that rogue nations will 
forego their pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
Export Controls 
The use of controls to limit the export of sensitive technologies which 
nations could employ in the production of nuclear weapons represents the 
second prong of the traditional U.S. nonproliferation strategy. The United 
States has implemented these controls both unilaterally through domestic 
6 
Counter-Proliferation Strategy 
legislation and multilaterally in cooperation with other states concerned 
about proliferation risks. An example of a multilateral organization that 
assists in the nonproliferation effort is the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which 
seeks to control the export of fissionab le material to potential proliferants. 
Another multi lateral organization that might have been employed to assist 
in the nonproliferation effort is the Coordinating Committee for Multi lat­
eral Export Controls (COCOM). Though this organization concentrated its 
efforts on limiting technological exports to the Soviet Bloc, its controls 
could have b een used against states pursuing the nuclear option. However, 
COCOM disbanded on 31 March 1995.15 Thus, controls on the export of 
dual-use technology have weakened. 1 6  In September 1995, negotiations for 
a replacement to COCOM were negotiated in Paris.  This new organization, 
called the "New Forum," includes Russia among its memb ers. While 
Russian participation may be  useful, doubts exist about that nation's 
commitment to the control of the spread of nuclear technology. "As the 
case of the Russian-Iranian reactor deal graphically demonstrates, Moscow 
has proven reluctant to deny its clients whatever hardware they want. At a 
minimum, Moscow can be expected to serve as the middleman for transfers 
of any technology that might yet be denied the likes of Iraq and North 
Korea but that can be sold to the former Soviet Union.,,17 China is not a 
member of the New Forum, due largely to U.S. concerns about its exports 
to Pakistan and Iran. The New Forum, while a useful organization, does 
not possess the means to enforce its provisions. 
The United States also takes unilateral measures in an attempt to control 
proliferation. For example, the Export Administration Act of 1979 estab­
lishes limi ts on the type and amount of sophisticated technology that V.S. 
manufacturers may export.
18 
Additionally, the Department of Commerce 
controls the export of sensitive nuclear technologies pursuant to the Nu­
clear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.19 However, the Clinton administra­
tion, which has set the expansion of trade as one of its primary goals, has 
lifted export controls over certain sophisticated products. Furthermore, in 
1993, the standards that control the export of V.S. mainframe computers 
were eased to allow greater exports. Thus, the V.S. commitment to certain 
categories of export controls appears to be wavering. 
Moreover, two factors cast doubt on the ability of export controls to 
prevent the spread of sophisticated technology. First, many types of tech­
nologies are applicable to both civilian and military purposes. Preventing 
the export of such "dual use" items b ecause they might be used in a weapons 
development program is both difficul t and costly to V.S. business interests. 
7 
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Second, in an increasingly competitive global economic environment, 
exporters from other nations less concerned about proliferation risks might 
fill any void created by the unwillingness of the U.S. government to allow 
the export of sophisticated American technology. 
Weakening the Prongs 
The force of recent events has weakened both prongs of the traditional 
U.S. nonproliferation strategy. On the one hand, theNPT has not succeeded 
fully in calming fears of proliferation. On the other, the U ni ted States has 
eased its export control programs in order to enable a competitive trade 
policy. Given these realities and the fact that the geopolitical landscape 
differs markedly from the days of the Cold War, when both superpowers 
could influence their allies and client states on nonproliferation issues, the 
Clinton administration has identified a need to examine alternatives to 
traditional American nonproliferation approaches. Hence, the administra­
tion has decided to explore the area of counter-proliferation. On 7 Decem­
ber 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the Defense 
Counter-Proliferation Initiative. The Initiative explores the possibility of 
developing a more aggressive U.S. stance on nonproliferation.
20 
As part of 
this initiative, the Pentagon is to study new weapon s!Jstems specifically 
designed to destroy the assets of a potential proliferant. 1 For example, the 
Pentagon is researching weapon systems that could destroy hidden devel­
opment sites.22 The Initiative also created an office within the Department 
of Defense to articulate and implement this strategy.
23 
The current interest in counter-proliferation raises serious policy issues 
regarding both its status pursuant to international law and its political 
legitimacy in the post-Cold War world. These issues provide the frame­
work for this study. This study will not address the likelihood of success 
of any U.S. counter-proliferation strike, for that question is beyond the 
scope of the paper, and research was not conducted on the likelihood of 
success or failure of such a strike. Rather, the paper concentrates on the 
international law aspects of counter-proliferation, assessing for those pur­
poses whether a counter-proliferation strategy is advisable. Of course, U.S. 
policy makers must take into account the tactical and strategic as well as 
the legal particulars of any application of a counter-proliferation strategy. 
8 
III 
Counter-Proliferation: Defining the Issues 
The Legal Issues 
D
EFINED BY ONE SCHOLAR as "the body of rules and principles of 
action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with 
one another,,,
24 
in ternational law is vi tal to the Uni ted States. This country, 
as a preeminent economic and military power, relies upon the rule of 
international law to provide a stable framework in which to conduct its 
international affairs. Without the existence of these rules, the United 
States, along with the other nations of the international community, could 
not conduct its affairs with any degree of certainty. The absence of such 
rules would create a chaotic environment in which nations would act 
without guidelines, and the possibility of violent conflicts would increase 
substantially. The existence of these legal norms creates a relatively stable 
environment in which members of the international community may 
conduct their affairs with some confidence. 
However, the implementation of a strategy of counter-proliferation 
would raise serious questions of international law, particularly in the public 
international law areas of intervention and self-defense, as well as in the 
area of the law of war and armed conflict. These questions include: 
• Would the world community recognize the counter-proliferation 
strategy as lawful? 
• If so, under what circumstances? 
• May an aggressive counter-proliferation policy exist in a world 
community predominantly based on the international legal norms 
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of sovereignty and nonintervention? Or have these norms deterio­
rated to the point where a counter-proliferation action would be 
legitimate under certain mitigating circumstances? 
• How are such measures addressed by international legal instru­
ments, such as the Charter of the United Nations and the NPT? 
• What type of precedent would a coun ter-proliferation endeavor set 
for future acts of intervention conducted either unilaterally or 
multilaterally? 
• What recent precedents provide lessons for those nations consid­
ering the counter-proliferation strategy? 
The Realpolitik Questions 
Beyond these legal questions are several realpolitik issues which U.S. 
policy makers must address before implementing a counter-proliferation 
strategy. These questions include: 
• Would a counter-proliferation policy be desirable even if legally 
untenable? If legally tenable? 
• What ale the likely consequences of either exercising or announc­
ing a counter-proliferation policy? 
• Should the United States implement a counter-proliferation strat­
egy unilaterally, or should it attempt to b�d a multilateral coali­
tion willing to undertake such endeavors? 
• More generally, what political costs are associated with counter­
proliferation? 
Without an understanding of the political dimensions of this issue, U.S. 
defense planners might develop a comprehensive counter-proliferation 




Intervention and Counter-Proliferation 
A
CTING SOLELY OR AS A MEMBER of a multilateral coalition, the 
United States may attempt to justify a counter-proliferation action 
on the international legal theories of justified intervention and preemptive 
self-defense. Broad international acceptance of these theories as applied to 
counter-proliferation might enable the United States or a multilateral 
coalition to emJ'loy these techniques without violating the norms of inter­
national law.2 Alternatively, if these theories are not accepted, broad 
international condemnation can be expected. Consequently, U.S. defense 
planners must address these critical legal issues if they are to make accurate 
assessments regarding the international acceptability of counter-prolifera­
tion. Moreover, the acceptability of counter-proliferation measures may 
depend on whether they are conducted unilaterally or multilaterally. Thus, 
it is important to analyze these legal questions from both perspectives. 
Intervention Generally 
International law generally prohibi ts intervention. As Lori Fisler Dam­
rosch notes: 
International law has condemned and sought to constrain [interven­
tion] because of a conviction that important values are served by 
allowing each polity to develop in its own way within internationally 
recognized boundaries. The legal rules against intervention are espe­
cially cherished by those who see them as essential safeguards for 
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sma1l7r states a��inst abuses at the hands of states that can wield vastly 
supenor power. 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
28 
reflects this conviction. It states, "All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.,,
2 9  
Historically, intervention has not always been universally condemned 
despite its present status. Before World War I, when the Great Powers of 
Europe
30 
dominated the in ternationallandscape, a taci t sys tern existed that 
permitted each Great Power to intervene in conflicts outside of Europe so 
long as that Power conducted the action within its own imperial domain. 
In other words, intervention was permissible so long as one Great Power 
did not explicitly violate the interests of another.
31 
In exchange for the 
freedom to in tervene in their areas of national interest beyond Europe, each 
Power implicitly agreed to respect existing boundaries on the Continent 
itself. The system reflected the mutual interests of the elite states of Europe 
in dominating an undeveloped world through colonialism, while promot­
ing continental stability. Intervention became a tool in the pre-First World 
War balance-of-power system. 
This system came crashing down around the Great Powers when they 
ceased to respect the established borders of Europe.32 However, the exist­
ence of this bifurcated system permitting colonial intervention while 
prohibiting continental invasion demonstrates that the international com­
munity has not always accepted the current norm compelling universal 
nonintervention. "It is important to note . " that the present means of law 
enforcement available to states is considerably more restricted than that 
provided for in the classical period of international law.,,
33 
The current norm is the product of a perceived need by post-World War 
I  leaders to protect the principle of sovereignty. These leaders attributed 
the cause of World War II to the refusal of Germany and Japan to respect 
international borders. Following the war, leaders of the Allied nations 
recognized a need to construct international institutions that would pre­
vent future erosion of sovereignty by making unilateral intervention ille­
gitimate. Not surprisingly, the creators of the United Nations fashioned a 
legal system that could deal effectively with the type of problems, such as 
invasion, which sparked World War II; however, this system, with its 
emphasis on the principle of sovereignty, necessarily limits the ability of 
12 
Counter-Proliferation Strategy 
states to deal with different dilemmas, including the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.
34 
As Jost Delbriick notes: 
The responsibility of states for the enforcement of international erga 
omnes norms and the responsibility of the community of states for the 
enforcement of international law protecting public international com­
munity interests do not provide a legal basis frr military enforcement 
measures outside the U.N. Charter's system. 3 
The U.N. Charter codifies this strategy. Article 2(1) states that "The 
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.,,
36 
Given the fundamental premise that one state is neither 
better nor worse than another, and sovereignty is paramount, intervention 
becomes illegitimate. Article 2(4), quoted above, reflects this conviction. 
Article 2(7), which prohibits intervention by the United Nations, except 
in instances when the Securi ty Council deems necessary, further reinforces 
the prominence of sovereignty by generally permittinl governments to 
handle in ternal disputes wi thou t ou tside in terference. 3 
Consequently, when examined in historical terms, as Marc Trachten­
berg points out, "intervention should generally be thought of as part of a 
system .... ,,
38 
That system, as codified by the U.N. Charter, traditionally 
has frowned upon intervention.39 However, just as the system prior to 
World War I became outdated by world events, the possibility exists that 
the present system has outlived its usefulness. The time may be ripe for the 
most powerful of the international community to consider whether inter­
vention should become acceptable for limited purposes. 
Unilateral Intervention and Counter-Proliferation 
Under present tenets of international law, the world community likely 
would condemn an instance of unilateral intervention to destroy the 
weapons development programs of a potential proliferant. The one explicit 
example of the use of unilateral force to destroy the nuclear facilities of 
another state produced such a reaction.
40 
When Israeli F-16s destroyed the 
Osirak nuclear reactor under construction near Baghdad in June 1981, the 
international response was immediate, and the United Nations condemned 
the Israeli action.
41 
Despite the threat posed to the region by the nascent 
existence of an Iraqi nuclear program, the international community felt 
compelled to depict the Israeli action as violative of international law. 
While the status ofIsrae1 within the international community casts doubt 
13 
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upon the value of this precedent, at a minimum, the condemnation should 
give pause to any nation contemplating similar action. 
Given this precedent, the likelihood that a unilateral counter-prolifera­
tion effort would draw the ire of the international community is great. After 
all, the U.N. Charter explicitly condemns unilateral intervention. Nonin­
tervention is the norm, and states, particularly those of the Third World, 
are unlikely to see the cause of strict nonproliferation, despite its impor­
tance to the industrialized world, as a justification for unilateral action. As 
Virginia Gamba explains, "[P]owerless states have come to view interven­
tion with deep misgivings, either because they have been direct recipients 
of it or because they have had to condition their options so as to avoid it .... 
Intervention has become associated with the loss of freedom.,,42 Forced to 
make the choice between conceding a portion of their sovereignty or 
sacrificing a strict nonproliferation regime, less powerful states dependent 
upon the present norm are likely to opt for the latter. A unilateral counter­
proliferation effort initiated by the United States, for example, would create 
a precedent that many developing, less powerful states might find unac­
ceptable. 
One must bear in mind that the 
,w
ospect of proliferation chiefly con­
cerns the current nuclear powers. 3 These nations in particular have 
classified proliferation as a threat to international peace and securitl' 
While the possibility of proliferation also concerns less developed states, 4 
the poorer nations are unlikely to surrender a portion of their sovereignty 
solely for the sake of the current order upon which the present nuclear 
powers depend.4S The developed states, particularly those which possess 
nuclear weapons, have a greater interest in maintaining the nonprolifera­
tion regime. First, states equipped with nuclear weapons are thought to be 
less subject to pressure from states without a nuclear capability. Second, 
while the developed states, by and large, are less subject to pressure by the 
international community, smaller states employ the concept of sovereignty 
as a shield from pressures placed upon them by the industrialized world. 
These smaller states-greatly in the majority of the General Assem­
bly-are unlikely to accede to a weakening of the sovereignty concept. 
For the United States, these priorities mean that the international 
community likely would condemn unilateral counter-proliferation efforts 
involving U.S. military forces for which the United States does not have 
U.N. authorization. In conducting a counter-proliferation attack, the 
United States would be in prima facie violation of several provisions of the 
U.N. Charter, including Article 2(3),46 Article 2(4), and Article 33(1), 
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which demands that parties attempt to settle their disputes peacefully.47 
The fact that the United States has a veto in the U.N. Security Council 
would do little to change the perception in the world community that the 
counter-proliferation act was de facto illegal. Unilateral intervention de­
signed to save an imperfect nonproliferation regime, despi te laudable goals, 
is incompatible with current international law. 
Multilateral Intervention and Counter-Proliferation 
If U.S. policy makers deem unilateral intervention unacceptable, one 
alternative they might pursue in their quest to prevent proliferation would 
be to expand the scope of any counter-proliferation effort from a unilateral 
endeavor to a multilateral one. The approval and participation of the 
international community would enhance the legitimacy of any interven­
tion designed to prevent proliferation. As Robert Pastor observes, "Just as 
congressional consent for a U.S. military action gives the president a 
cushion of support, collective action is, in the long term, more effective 
than unilateral action in forging an international community.,,
48 
Currently, the legitimacy of multilateral intervention for any pUr.R0se is 
being debated widely among international lawyers and scholars. 9 The 
protection of human rights, for example, is often proposed as a basis that 
would justify multilateral intervention. The entrance of forces sanctioned 
by the United Nations into Somalia in 1992 was predicated upon the need 
for humanitarian assistance to its threatened civilian populace.
So 
However, 
multiple legal barriers, including many of those standing in the path of 
unilateral intervention, exist in the pursuance of a workable multilateral 
strategy. 
The first such obstacle is the U.N. Charter itself, which, as noted 
above, rests upon a presumption prohibiting intervention. Chapter VII 
of the Charter does provide for U.N. intervention in limited circum­
stances. Specifically, Article 42 states, "Should the Security Council 
consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [measures not involv­
ing the use of force] would be inadequate or have proved to be inade­
quate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Sl 
The United Nations has employed this power sparingly, generally due 
to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were at odds in 
many of the disputes in which the United Nations might have played a 
15 
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role. Each superpower either utilized a veto or threatened to utilize one to 
block collective U.N. initiatives. 
However, with the collapse of bipolarity, the United Nations has taken 
a more active role in the use of i ts intervention powers. The support by the 
United Nations of the U.S.-led coalition which ousted Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait in 1991 provides an example of this increased willingness to 
support intervention. As part of the action to free Kuwait, a coalition of 
military forces led by the United States and supported by the United 
Nations attacked Iraqi nuclear assets. Thus, counter-proliferation became 
one of the elements employed to justify coalition action against Iraq.
S2 
Overall, the ability of the United Nations to exercise its intervention 
powers appears to be growing.S3 Perhaps someday the Security Council will 
have the ability to call on its own dedicated forces pursuant to Article 43 
of the Charter to intercede against potential proliferants.
S4 
Still, legal 
restraints on the use of U.N. forces continue to frustrate U.N. measures. 
For example, even if multilateral, intervention carries with it an element 
of imperialism. As Marc Trachtenberg states, "[T]he powerful states at the 
cen ter of the system will never themselves be the target of in terventions of 
this sort. ,,55 
It remains to be seen whether the United Nations could exercise these 
powers to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. First, the political 
problems of building multilateral coalitions to take military action are 
substantial. One need only examine the difficulty in building a coalition 
to intervene in the hostilities in the Balkans to understand the political 
difficulties inherent in coalition construction. Even the U.S.-led coalition 
against Iraq had limited objectives.
S6 
While the United States considered 
expanding the goals of the coalition to include the ouster oflraqi President 
Saddam Hussein, U.S. leaders ultimately decided not to initiate such an 
action, and Hussein remains in office. 
Moreover, a multilateral endeavor often does not accomplish its tasks as 
efficiently as a unilateral effort. Coalition-building requires compromises 
which may prevent optimal counter-proliferation operations. An examina­
tion of the effort against Iraq is illustrative, as the U.S.-led coalition ceased 
offensive operations before ousting Saddam Hussein in order to ensure the 
political continuity of its multilateral force.
S7 
President George Bush and 
his advisors believed that marching to Baghdad would have gone beyond 
the Security Council's specific authorization, jeopardizing the coalition's 
integrity, particularly among its Arab partners which might not have 




Since unilateral acts of counter-proliferation cannot lawfully exist 
within the current international framework, and acts of multilateral inter­
vention, which themselves have legal difficulties, often fail to accomplish 
their objectives, the question arises as to what options U.S. defense plan­
ners possess when confronted with a rogue state on the verge of acquiring 
or developing a nuclear weapon. When faced with this scenario, policy 
makers are left with three alternatives, none of which is without flaws. The 
first is to abandon the strategy of counter-proliferation entirely, due to its 
apparent illegality. The second option is to pursue the strategy in spite of 
the present norm against unilateral intervention and the barriers to mul­
tilateral intervention. The third choice is to attempt to forge an updated 
norm creating an alternative legal framework which would permit the 
strategy, whether implemented unilaterally or multilaterally, to coexist 
with present international legal rules. Each alternative possesses potential 
costs and benefits. This section analyzes the strategy's respective strengths 
and weaknesses, attempting to define and sharpen the legal issues so that 
policy makers will be able to make informed decisions which will further 
U.S. nonproliferation goals. 
Abandoning the Counter-Proliferation Strategy. Abandoning the coun ter­
proliferation strategy offers the first alternative to U.S. planners. The chief 
legal advantage of this approach is that it would provide the United States 
with an avenue to avoid the legal consequences that could result from 
intervention generally and counter-proliferation specifically. Among the 
possible adverse consequences facing the United States if it were to stage a 
counter-proliferation attack are that it risks international condemnation, 
alliance strain, threatens the nonproliferation regime and the NPT and, in 
its most extreme form, risks the initiation of war. If the United States 
desires to avoid these risks, then dismissing the counter-proliferation 
option would be the easiest course. The United States and its allies have a 
great deal invested in the current international legal order and the nonpro­
liferation regime. Taking measures, such as the most aggressive form of 
counter-proliferation, that could jeopardize the canons of international law 
would create substantial dangers for those nations most dependent upon 
that system's survival. 
On the other hand, if the United States were to abandon the counter­
proliferation strategy, it would incur costs, including accepting the fact that 
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it would be unable to prevent the development of a nuclear weapon by a 
rogue state. For example, despite the recent fragile agreement between 
North Korea and the United States, at some point the United States, along 
with its allies in the region, mifh t  be forced to accep t the existence of a 
North Korean nuclear weapon.5 U.S. leaders may be willing to accept this 
result as the price for maintaining the current international legal order. Of 
course, the United States also might attempt to enforce the trad itional 
norms against nonproliferation by imposing sanctions against the poten­
tial proliferant and urging other states to do the same. However, as noted 
earlier, the traditional nonproliferation strategies may not be adequate to 
the task of preventing the truly dedicated proliferant from producing a 
nuclear weapon. 
Ignoring the Legal Consequences o/Counter-Proli/eration. The legal ad­
vantages (as opposed to any political or national security advantages) of 
ignoring the current international legal prohibition on intervention are 
difficult to detect. For reasons of national security, U.S.  decision makers 
migh t be wil ling to make this sacrifice to halt pro liferation. However, since 
the application of unilateral counter-proliferation measures is aprima/acie 
violation of the U.N. Charter, no immediate legal advantage would result. 
One potential long-term legal advantage, if one b elieves a policy of 
counter-proliferation is desirable, is that it would set the precedent for 
future counter-proliferation effons. Basically, the first U.S. coun ter-prolif­
eration strike would set the stage for future effons, making them easier to 
justify. Such a counter-proliferation strike also might deter states consid­
ering the development of weapons of mass destruction from initiating a 
program. Finally, by demonstrating its willingness to use counter-prolif­
eration, the United States might force potential proliferants to move their 
programs underground, thereby increasing developmental costs and ex­
tending the time needed to produce a nuclear weapon. 
The costs of violating the norm would appear to be high. The interna­
tional community likely would condemn the United States for violations 
of the U.N. Chaner. Moreover, the counter-proliferation action would 
undermine, perhaps fatally, the nonproliferation regime by demonstrating 
that the NPT had failed, at least wi th respect to the nation subjected to the 
counter-proliferation strike. Despite these consequences, the United States 
might absorb the costs, which also might include alliance strain-and 
possibly war-if it firmly believed that the alternative of a nuclear­
equipped rogue state is unaccep table. 
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Creating a Norm Permitting Counter-Proliferation. The third alternative 
involves an attempt by the United States to assist in the development of a 
new international legal norm permitting intervention for the specific 
purpose of destroying the weapons development programs of potential 
proliferants. The establishment of this new norm thereby would justify 
U.S. counter-proliferation activities. Intervention for these limited pur­
poses would no longer violate international law. In undertaking this effort, 
the United States would have to maintain that the legal standards that have 
existed since the conclusion of World War II have become antiquated wi th 
the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the international community must 
develop updated norms addressing the problems of the post-Cold War era. 
Limited intervention to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons would 
become one component of this new system. 
The benefi ts of the successful adoption of this strategy are that it would 
permit the United States to engage in necessary counter-proliferation 
activities without drawing the ire of the international community. Of 
course, convincing this community that counter-proliferation should be­
come a norm in the international legal system would not be easy. The 
diplomatic task would be enormous, perhaps impossible, requiring a radi­
cal expansion in the interpretation of the U.N. Charter. In effect, an 
exception would have to be crafted into the Charter, allowing for unilateral 
intervention for the purpose of preventing nuclear proliferation. At a 
minimum, the U.N. Security Council would need to authorize a counter­
proliferation strike, through some approval mechanism, presumably on a 
case by case basis. However, such authorization might be impossible to 
obtain in those circumstances when a permanent Securi ty Council member 
protects the potential proliferant through the use of a veto. Thus, the 
Security Council might be able to authorize counter-proliferation actions 
against only the most isolated pariah states. 
Even if the international community were to adopt this proposal, costs 
would still accrue. Its adoption also would demonstrate the failings of the 
nonproliferation regime's current dependence on the NPT. Moreover, the 
adoption of this scheme would drive a wedge between the nuclear "haves" 
and "have-nots." To a large extent, the scheme would resemble the system 
that existed in the international community prior to World War I, with the 
nuclear powers cast in the role of the Great Powers of Europe. Not without 
some justification, smaller, nonnuclear states could label this new system 
"nuclear imperialism." 
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Additionally, if a counter-proliferation exception to the prohibition 
against intervention were to exist for the United States, it would be difficult 
to condemn similar activities conducted by another state which felt com­
pelled to take action against an adversary's weapons development program. 
Finally, the danger exists that counter-proliferation could become a con­
venient excuse for all types of intervention, whether justified or not. Taken 
together, these obstacles might prove too difficult to overcome to permit 
the creation of a counter-proliferation exception. The international com­
munity, believing that the potential costs of this updated system would 
outweigh any possible benefits, simply may be unwilling to expand the 
present tenets of international law to permit a strategy of counter-prolif­
eration. If this conclusion proves true, then the United States (or any other 
state contemplating the adoption of a counter-proliferation strategy) either 
will have to accept the costs such a strategy entails or discover another 
justification for its actions. 
20 
v 
Counter-Proliferation and the Concept of 
Anticipatory Self-Defense 
�� JHILE THE CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION provides one avenue to 
'0/ '0/ explore in this examination of counter-proliferation, another legal 
concept meriting discussion is the doctrine of self-defense. Specifically, a 
nation facing the prospect that its historic adversary may develop a nuclear 
warhead in the near future may feel compelled to respond militarily to its 
adversary's nuclear program. The question becomes whether the interna­
tional doctrine of self-defense justifies such a response. The following 
section analyzes the legal principles of self-defense to develop an answer. 
The Hypothetical Case 
Imagine that at some future time State X becomes concerned about the 
nuclear program of its historic adversary, State Y. While State Y claims 
that its program exists solely for peaceful purposes, State X, as well as much 
of the international community, is skeptical. Intelligence reports suggest 
that State Y is clandestinely developing the capacity to enrich uranium and 
reprocess plutonium. Furthermore, State Y is importing dual-use technol­
ogy that can assist in the construction of a nuclear warhead. State X has 
expressed its concerns to the international community through the Secu­
rityCouncil of the United Nations, but due to political considerations, the 
United Nations has taken no action. While the Security Council has 
The Newport Papers 
threatened to impose token sanctions, extensive measures that would prove 
effective are unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Given these facts and perceiving a need to counter State V's pending 
proliferation, State X feels compelled for reasons of national security to 
address the situation unilaterally. Fearing the development of nuclear 
weapons by State Y, State X attacks the nuclear facilities of State Y, 
destroying those facilities that it believes are integral components of an 
ongoing weapons development program. State X believes that its action is 
justified as an act of anticipatory self-defense. It reasons that the threat 
presented by State V's nuclear program was unacceptable. A nuclear-armed 
State Y, in the opinion of the leaders of State X, would have attacked State 
X. Fearing this scenario, State X decides that it cannot afford to wait any 
longer to protect itself. Furthermore, given the mild efforts by the inter­
national community to stem State V's activities, State X feels it cannot 
afford to await effective international sanctions. 
International reaction to the news of the destruction of State V's nuclear 
facili ties is swift. The international community roundly criticizes State X. 
The Security Council censures State X for violating the V.N. Charter and 
threatens sanctions against State X. Many nations believe the attack threat­
ens the nonproliferation regime, whose members renewed the NPT in 1995. 
The international community rejects StateX's self-defense arguments, and 
the Security Council passes a resolution condemning State X for violating 
Article 2(3) and Article 2(4) of the Charter, as well as for endangering the 
integri ty of the NPT. 
A Question of Self-Defense 
Although in this hypothetical scenario the international community 
condemns State X's action, one should inquire whether the preemptive 
attack truly was illegal pursuant to current norms of international law. 
When may a state re� on the concept of anticipatory self-defense to justify 
a preemptive strike? Does the V.N. Charter prohibit anticipatory self-de­
fense entirely? If not, under what circumstances may a state resort to 
anticipatory self-defense to solve a perceived risk to its national security? 
If international law does prohibit the use of unilateral anticipatory self-de­
fense, is this ban sound in an era of heightened proliferation concerns? Or 
may a state justify its act of counter-proliferation on the basis of anticipa­
tory self-defense? These questions are the focus of this section. 
22 
Counter-Proliferation Strategy 
U.S. defense planners may feel compelled to take mili  tary actio n against 
a potential proliferant. If  the concept of anticipatory self-defense justifies 
i ts action, the United States may be able to avoid international condemna­
tion for violations of international law. Moreover, if the international 
communi ty accepts a future claim of counter-proliferation as anticipatory 
self-defense, later acts may prove easier to justify, both for the U nited S tates 
and other nations considering counter-proliferation strikes . 
Analytical Method 
This portion of  the paper analyzes whether the international law of 
anticipatory self-defense or the related concept of reprisal would support a 
U.S.  strategy of counter-proliferation. First, it explores the curren t state of 
international law in the area of anticipatory self-defense. Two bodies of 
law, cus tomary international law and the Charter of the United Nations, 
influence though t on anticipatory self-defense. Following this examina­
tion of the law, the 198 1 Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor known 
as Tarnuz I near Baghdad is  analyzed in an attempt to discover whether 
international condemnation following that attack was warranted. Another 
question examined is whether policy makers in the United States may 
uti lize the concept of an ticipatory self-defense as a tool to support a s trategy 
of counter-proliferation.  The potential barriers U.S.  leaders would face in 
attempting to justify the strategy on this basis are described.  
In Chapter VI the international legal concept of  reprisal is  analyzed, 
examining how this concept fits into the counter-proliferation framework. 
Although the international community generally denounces p eacetime 
military reprisal s, the community may need to reexamine thei r validity 
in an era when the perceived dangers o f  proliferation are increasing. 
Chapter VII studies counter-proliferation operations during war. Finally, 
Chapter VIII offers recommendations which the members of the interna­
tional community might consider as they address the threat of nuclear 
proliferation. International legal norms need to be reconsidered if  the 
nonproliferation regime is to meet its forthcoming challenges.  The inter­
national community mus t  decide which is more critical, maintaining the 
existing international legal norm on self-defense, although the problems 
of proliferation will tax it, or developing updated norms that will  address 
proliferation concerns but which also might give nations greater license to 
take otherwise illegal offensive military action, thereby challenging the 
legitimacy of the U.N. Charter. 
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Inte rnati onal Law and Anti cipatory Se lf-Defense 
The Definition of Self-Defense . Although seemingly obvious, the defini­
tion of self-defense is not necessari ly clear. Self-defense, contrary to what 
some might b elieve, is not designed to punish an aggressor. Punishment 
is  accomplished through reprisal, discussed below. Rather, as Richard J. 
Erickson explains : 
The purpose of self-defense is to preserve the status quo . . . .  Self-de­
fense does not seek the biblical eye for an eye; rather it seeks to preserve 
world public order which is threatened by permitting the use of force 
as an emergency measure "strictly confined to the removal of the 
danger." Thus, a nation acting in self-defense will apply force in a 
restricted fashion that is regulated in scope and objective. Methods and 
means, as well as targets, will be carefully selected to achieve the narrow 
preventative purpose of self-defense ang will not be directed in such a 
manner as to be punitive in character .6 
Unfortunately, the line between that which i s  defensive and that which 
is  punitive is  rarely bright. Nations often frame punitive actions i n  the 
guise of self-defense, and frequently the international communi ty lab els 
acts of self-defense as punitive because the com munity tends to prefer the 
avoidance of conflict to the implementation of i usti ce.
6 1  
To reduce this  
confusion, the history of in ternational law on self-defense and i ts influence 
in sh aping current views on the accep tance of anticipatory self-defense 
must be understood. 
Customary lntenuztional Law: The Caroline Case. Any discussion of a 
right to anticipatory self-defense should begin with an analysis o f  the 
Caroline case of 1 837.62 This case involved a dispute between the U ni ted 
States and Great Bri tain over the activities of British forces in the Canadian 
province of Ontario . An insurrection against British rule had occurred in 
Ontario, and British forces were attempting to eradicate it  when an expe­
ditionary patrol of the British army destroyed the privately owned U .S. 
vessel Caroline, which had been supplying the rebels with arms, in the 
American waters of Lake Ontario.  The U ni ted S tates protested the British 
action, and the British government defended i t  on the ground that i ts forces 
were acting in self-defense. 
In 1842, in a subsequent diplomatic exchange between the parties, U.S.  
S ecretary of  State Daniel Webster enunciated a doctrine designed to 
determine when an act of anti cipatory self-defense would become accept­
able. Recent commentators observe : 
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This fonnulation, known as the Caroline doctrine, asserts that use of 
force by one nation against another is permissible as a self-defense 
action only if force is both necessary and proportionate. The first of 
these conditions, necessity, means that resort to force in response to 
an armed attack, or the imminent threat ofan armed attack, is allowed 
only when an alternative means of redress is lacking. The second 
condition, proportionality, is linked closely to necessity in requiring 
that a use of force in self-d$fense must not exceed in manner or aim 
the necessity provoking it.6 
Th rough international acceptance of this standard, an ticipatory self-de­
fense became legal in  certain limited circumstances . In  Webster's words, 
the threat of attack had to be "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation. '
.64 
For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the international 
legal regime accepted Webster's test. If a nation reasonably believed that 
an attack from an adversary was looming, i t  could preemp t that attack so 
long as i ts use of force was reasonable. However, this standard was subject 
to abuse. Nations often defended patently offensive military actions with 
self-defense justifications. For example, the United States attributed i ts 
decision to i nvade Mexico in  the 1 846 Mexican-American War partially on 
grounds of self-defense. This "self-defensive" action led to the an nexation 
of the modern states of the U.S.  Southwest, induding California. 
The League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. I n  the aftermath of 
the First World War, the international com munity sought to codify inter­
national law on the use of force. However, neither the 1 9 1 8  Covenant of 
the League ofN ations
65 
nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1 928,66 which were 
products of these efforts, altered the customary international law on self­
defense.  Both mai n tained the cus tomary right, induding the right to 
anticipatory self-defense when the threat was imminent and the response 
proportionate. While the League of Nations was designed to give nations 
a forum i n  which to discuss their dispu tes, and the Kel logg-Briand Pact 
was designed to prohibit  resort to war "as an instrument of national 
policy,'
.67 
neither document was designed to prevent states under duress 
from taking effective defensive action to preemp t an adversary's mili tary 
aggression. Thus, through World War II,  Webster's concep t ofanticipatory 
self-defense survived. However, the language of the U.N. Charter has 
clouded the concep t's previous clarity. 
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The United Nations Charter 
Article 51 .  Much of the controversy surrounding the right of a nation 
to engage in anticipatory self-defense centers on the language of Article 5 1  
of the U.N. Charter, which states : 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an anned attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense 
shall be immediately reponed to the Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and · 68 secunty. 
Two conflicting views of this language have provoked a debate regarding 
a nation's righ t to act in anticipatory self-defense.69 One view holds that 
the language of Article 5 1  must be read restrictively, forbidding acts of 
self-defense excep t after an actual armed attack. Proponents of this view 
maintain that permitting states to resort to force b efore an adversary's 
attack would lead to errors in judgment, producing conflicts that otherwise 
might be avoided?O Funhermore, and taken to its extreme, this argument 
posits that once the Security Council takes "measures necessary to main­
tain international peace and security," al!X acts of self-defense, even if not 
initiated preemptively, must terminate. 1 Thus, according to the most 
restrictive reading of Arti cle 5 1 ,  once the Security Cou ncil takes action, 
perhaps by imposing only limited economic sanctions, any continued 
defensive action is invalid. 
One illustration of how this interpretation would have applied is the 
Security Council's response to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Accord­
ing to the most restrictive view, once the Securi ty Council  passed resolu­
tions es tablishing economic sanctions against Iraq, "the Kuwaiti righ t to 
resist no longer exis ted. Accordingly, Kuwait would be forced to wai t and 
see if the sanctions worked, or if the Security Council decided to take 
additional [military] action . . . . ,,72 
Critics of this approach believe that this view overstates the meaning of 
Anicle 5 1 ,73 contending that not only does the righ t to self-defense extend 
beyond the initiation of action by the Security Council, but  also exists in 
anticipation of an armed attack. Support for this argument derives from 
the negotiating history (travaux preparatoires) of Article 5 1 ,  which does not 
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purport to renounce th e prior customary international law on self-de­
fense.14 "The negotiating history at the San Francisco Conference [which 
established the Uni ted Nations] reveals that Arti cle 5 1  was intended to 
incorporate th e entire customary law or 'inherent right' of self-defense. The 
comprehensive incorporation of the customary law includes reasonab le 
and necessary anticipatory self-defense since this has always been a part of 
customary law.,,
7S 
Thus, the Charter must b e  read in light of customary international law 
at the time of i ts creation in 1945 . This reading suggests that the right to 
self-defense has remained virtually unchanged since Webster's formula­
tion of the anticipatory self-defense standard in the 1 84Os.16 The right to 
anticipatory self-defense continues to exist so long as the action satisfies 
the imminence and proportionality requirem ents first enunciated by Web­
ster in the Caroline discussions. If  overwhelming evidence exists that 
demonstrates an attack is  forthcomi ng, th en so long as preemptive action 
is proportional to the threat, it should be legal pursuant to international 
law. The Uni ted S tates has adopted this view, believing that anticipatory 
self-defense is perm issible at least in certain con texts. I n  1 986, Secretary of 
State George P. Shul tz stated that a country is "permi tted to use force to 
preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue i ts ci tizens when no 
other means are availab le.,,77 
Th e Advantages of Maintaining a Right to Anticipatory Self-De­
fense. While the U.N. Charter may or may not limit the right to anticipa­
tory self-defense, the option has not b een eliminated entirely. The problem 
that would be created by an overly restrictive b an on anticipatory self-de­
fense is that it would treat all  cases, from i nvasions by insurgent guerrilla 
forces to nuclear attacks, similarly.
78 
I n  an era of modern weaponry, 
nations should not be compelled to await  a potentially devastating first­
strike before undertaking lawful measures of self-defense.
19 This is par­
ticularly true in the case of a pendi ng nuclear attack when the potential for 
devastation is acute. As Beth Polebaum notes, "The Charter should not b e  
read t o  require one nation to permi t another th e b enefits o f  mili tary 
armament, surprise attack, and offensive advantage, against which no 
defense may lie. If the Charter is  to be  an effective instrument, i t  must be 
read to accommodate the needs of the con temporary world.,,80 
The challenge for the international legal regi me is to create guiding 
parameters in which a nation could take anticipatory defensive measures 
with the reasonable expectation that the international community would 
accept them. However, this standard should not give na tions a carte blanche 
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to cast offensive actions in the legitimizing glow of self-defense. Discover­
ing the proper balance between these two extremes could prove daunting. 
A Case Study in Counte r-Prol ife rati on: Th e Israel i DestnJ ction 
of the I raqi N uclear Reactor Tamuz I 
In an attempt to discover the elusive b alance permitting anticipatory 
self-defense in the nuclear age, one should study the events of the most 
notorious instance of counter-proliferation to date : the Israeli attack on the 
Iraqi nuclear facility known as Tamuz I near Baghdad in 1 98 1 .  The 
international community roundly condemned this attack. Why? Which 
elements of the attack made the Israeli government's self-defense jus tifica­
tions unacceptable? Was the conclusion of the international community 
made hastily? What lessons can these events offer regarding the require­
ments of a legitimate counter-proliferation action b ased upon the theory 
of anticipatory self-defense? The destruction of the Iraqi reactor offers 
valuable lessons for U.S .  policy makers as they consider the develop ment 
of U.S.  counter-proliferation policy. 
The Facts. On Sunday, 7 June 1 98 1 ,  eight Israeli F- 1 6 fighter planes 
manufactured in the United States bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor under 
construction near Baghdad. "The bombs were deposited with impressive 
precision, and within two minutes the reactor was destroyed."
S l 
The Israeli 
government, led by Prime Minister Menachem Begin, justified its action 
on the basis of self-defense. 82 In support of its position, the Israeli govern­
ment claimed that " [s]ources of unquestioned reliability told us that [the 
reactor] was intended . . .  for the production of atomic bombs .  The goal of 
these bombs was Israel .,,83 
The construction of the Iraqi reactor, undertaken with the assistance of 
French and Italian technicians, had concerned the international commu­
nity prior to the Israeli attack. In 1 9 80, Iran had attempted to destroy the 
facility during its war with Iraq.84 The reactor's ability to produce weap­
ons-grade fissionable material also concerned the United States .85 
Israel conducted the raid secretly, not informing the United States or 
any of its other alli es of the attack until its completion.86 This lack of 
information led the Reagan administration to suspend delivery of four 
F- 1 6s which Israel had previously purchased from the United States.
87 
International Reaction. International reaction to the daring Israeli raid 
was swift and overwhelmingly negative. The United S tates, France, the 
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Arab states and the Soviet Union condemned the attack as a violation of 
international law.
88 
Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United 
Nations, stated on the day following the raid that it was "[a] clear contra­
vention ofinternational law.,,
89 
On 1 9  June 1 98 1 ,  the Security Council, in 
Resolution 487, condemned the raid and ordered Israel to make reparations 
to Iraq for the latter's 10sses.
90 The United States ab stained when this vote 
occurred.
91  The internation al communi ty rej ected Israeli arguments that 
the strike was an act of self-defense.92 
Th e international community also was concerned that the raid would 
weaken the nonproliferation regime. The raid suggested that despite a 
nation's acquiescence to IAEA safeguards,93 its nuclear facilities still migh t  
be  sub ject t o  a n  armed attack.
94 
Members of  the U .S.  Senate, who were 
concerned about the future of the nonproliferation regime, made similar 
argum ents . 9S 
Why Not Self-Defense. The international rejection ofthe Israeli argument 
that the attack against the Tamuz I reactor was an act of self-defense 
requires further analysis?6 Which element of th e requirements for a 
legitimate exercise of anticipatory self-defense did Israel fail to satisfy? 
Alternatively, did th e Israelis meet these requirements only to discover that 
the members of the international community chose to focus on external 
political considerations, such as Israel's isolated status in the world com­
munity, to justify their condemnation? 
Imminence of Attack by Iraq. One of the chief weaknesses of the Israeli 
defense claim was the fact that most  of the international community 
b elieved that Iraq was years away from developing a nucl ear warhead. 
Conse9uently, an Iraqi nuclear attack against Israel could not be immi­
nent.
9 
Accordingly, the Israelis failed to pass the imminence requirement 
of the anticipatory self-defense test, as "[t] here is no legal authori ty em­
powerin� a state to employ coercion against a speculative or non-i mminent 
threat." However, the Israeli claim that circumstances dictated early 
destruction of the facility has some meri t. The Israelis attacked the reactor 
b efore it went "critical," when nuclear material would be on site. The 
Israelis believed that this event would have occurred in the summer of 
1 98 1 . A later attack wou ld have risked the release of fissionable material, 
possibly spreading radiation over a wide area. Thus, according to the 
Israelis, for all intents and purposes, they were imminently subject to a 
nonnuclear attack by Iraq, and even if this were not the case, to have wai ted 
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until the reactor commenced production o f  nuclear fuel would have been 
irresponsible for both national security and environmental reasons .99 
The Raid Did Not Respond to an Illegal Iraqi Activity. The next factor 
militati ng against justification of the Israeli attack is the fact that most of 
the international community b elieved that Iraq was in compliance with i ts 
international legal obligations, including IAEA safeguards. lOO The pre­
sumption th at the Iraqi nuclear program was legal and safeguarded meant 
that the Israeli action was not defensive, but punitive. 
The prob lem with this analysis is that Israeli intel ligence had concluded 
that the Iraqis were in violation of their international accords and that the 
Iraqi government was committed to the clandes tine development of a 
nuclear warhead. WI Given the tradition of tense relations between Israel 
and Iraq, 102 the Israelis fel t  compelled to take action b ased upon their belief 
that Iraq was dedicated to constructing nuclear weapons. 
Israel Failed to Exhaust Diplomacy. The strongest argument justifying 
condemnation of the Israeli action was the fact that Israel failed to exhaust 
diplomatic channels in an attempt to solve its security con cerns prior to 
taking military action. 103 For example, Israel did not notify the  Uni ted 
States of its intentio n to strike the reactor. 104 Nor did the Israelis attempt 
to convince the French and I talian �overnments of the need to augment 
safeguards at the Tamuz I facility. 05 Finally, Israel did not take its 
complaint to the United Nations for a hearing on the matter. Hence, Israel 
may have resorted to military action prematurely. 
The Israelis could have demonstrated more patience. However, they also 
faced multiple dilemmas on the diplomatic front. First} a new French 
government had taken power only weeks before the raid. 06 Its ability to 
persuade the Iraqis to halt their program was questionable at best; only 
days b efore the attack, French Foreign Minister Claude Chepson had 
declared that, while not likely to engage in future nuclear programs with 
Iraq, the new French government would fulfill its predecessor's obliga­
tions . i07 Moreover, given the historic bias against Israel in the United 
Nations, taking its case to that multinational body did not seem a reason­
able alternative for the Israeli regime. While  the United States may have 
been able to make diplomatic efforts with the govern ment in Baghdad, 
its influence probab ly would have been minimal . Finally, diplomacy 
takes time to accomplish its objectives. Lengthy diplomatic discussions 
would have given the Iraqis more time to complete the reactor, perhaps 
even allowing them to bring fissionable material to the s ite. Exhausting 
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diplomatic lines might have proven disastrous for the Israelis if negotia­
tions had failed. The Iraqis would have bought time for their nuclear 
program while placating the international community. 
Proportionality. International law required that the Israelis take action 
in proportion to the threat against them when they engaged in their attack. 
The extent of the Israeli strike satisfied this requirement. 
108 
In Polebaum's 
succinct evaluation :  " [Israel] employed conventional weapons and de­
stroyed only the reactor capable of producing nuclear bombs . . . .  Baghdad 
was unharmed. Israel carried out the strike on a Sunday, when the reactor 
was presumably vacant, to ensure the safety of the French and Arab 
workers.,, 109 Had Israel possessed a less destructive means to accomplish 
its mission effectively, international law would have compelled it to try 
that method. This concept dictates that a mission of self-defense may 
incorpora te only the minimal amoun t of force necessary to accomplish its 
goals. However, i t  is unclear by what standard one should measure such 
force. Should the standard be based on the number of casualties, the extent 
of the destruction, the amount of force employed, or some combination 
thereof? Presumably, the predominant goal of this standard is to limit 
casualties .  Yet the amount of force employed does not necessarily corre­
spond to the extent of casualties, as precisely guided, powerful munitions 
may cause fewer casual ties than a less powerful weapon aimed erratically. 
The Israeli action caused li ttle collateral damage and few casual ties. ,, 1 1
0 
The Lessons from the Destruction of Tamuz I. The Israeli raid offers 
numerous lessons applicable to the counter-proliferation debate. However, 
the political status of Israel in  the international community in the early 
1980s may dilute their value, as it is unknown whether the international 
communi ty would apply the same standard to another nation. Despite  this 
caveat, the raid and i ts subsequent discussion may lead us to posit that 
self-defense will fail as a justification of a counter-proliferation activity if 
it neglects any part of a rigorous legal standard. An attacker must satisfy 
the four elements of the anticipatory self-defense test. First, the counter­
proliferation attack must corne in anticipation of an imminent attack by 
an adversary. Second, the potential proliferant must violate some aspect of 
international law, whether it be the NYf or some other international norm. 
Third, the nation considering a counter-proliferation assault must exhaust 
all reasonable diplomatic efforts before commencing mili tary action. And 
fourth, the counter-proliferation event, when i t  does occur, must be 
proportionate to the threat produced by the potentia l proliferation; the 
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military force employed should not exceed the minimum amount neces­
sary to accomplish the counter-proliferation task, as excessive force violates 
international law. 
Any nation contemplating a counter-proliferation action should not 
only understand it wil l  be difficult to meet the anticipatory self-defense 
standards but also realize that it will prove difficult to convince the 
members of the in ternational communi ty tha t its action actually has passed 
that test. In other words, since internation al politics is a largely subj ective 
arena, the attacker must not only pass the self-defense test, it also must 
prove it has passed. The attacker b ears the burden of proof in such 
situations. "[T] he world community is likely to hold the acting state to a 
high standard if the international reaction to the Israeli raid on the Iraqi 
Osirak [Tamuz I] nuclear reactor is any indication ."U I  The Israeli action 
arguably fulfilled all the requirem en ts of the an ti cipatory self-defense 
standard, yet friend and foe alike condemned the action. Thus, drawing 
upon what admittedly is a less than perfect example, in order for a state to 
justify its counter-proliferation activity to a skeptical world community, 
its evidence must prove clear and convincing. 
Another lesson one should take from the inciden t is that although a 
counter-proliferation strike may have high international legal costs, the 
price might be worth paying. The Israeli attack set back the I raqi nuclear 
program; however, subsequent events demonstrated Baghdad's determi­
nation to build nuclear weapons. But for the attack on the reactor, I raq 
might have been able to construct a warhead by the mid- 1980s. Israel could 
not have accepted this possibility, yet it is unclear w hether the Israeli 
government could have prevented Iraqi development of a warhead any later 
than 198 1 ,  especially if the reactor had gone critical. Thus, although the 
international community condemned Israel for an osten sibly illegal act, it 
is unlikely that I srael regrets the attack. Moreover, it is apparent that many 
other n ations, including the United States, do not regret the Israeli attack . 
For example, in 1 99 1 ,  U .S.  Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney publicly 
thanked the Israelis for thei r "bold and dramatic action.,,
1 1 2 
The Ability of the United States to Justify Counter-Proliferati on on the 
Theory of AntiCipatory Self-Defense 
If the United States were to engage in counter-proliferation measures, it 
might attempt to justify its action on the basis of anticipatory self-defense. 
Would the United S tates be able to sustain this argument, or would it face 
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the same type of condemnation which Israel endured after its attack on 
Tamuz I ?  Inevitable obstacles would face the United States if i t  were to 
defend its counter-proliferation action on this basis. These barriers corre­
spond to the requirements needed to justify any anticipatory action of 
self-defense. A failure to satisfy any of these criteria would make the action 
illegal pursuant to present norms of international law. 
While evaluating the legali ty of any U .S. deploymen t of the coun ter-pro­
liferation strategy depends somewhat upon unique circumstances, one may 
make a few assumptions regarding U.S. positions in a scenario in which it 
felt compelled to resort to the policy in its most violent form. The first 
assumption is that, at least for the foreseeable future, the United States will 
possess the more powerful military arsenal vis-a-vis any potential prolifer­
ant. Another assumption is that the United States would attempt to utilize 
the authority of the United Nations, at least initially, in order to support 
its action. Finally, given the principles of U.S. military strategy, the United 
States would employ substantial force to accomplish its counter-prolifera­
tion objectives. Redundancy is a hallmark of U.S.  military tactics. The 
tactics employed during "'Operation Desert Storm" demonstrated this 
tendency, as the U. S.-led coalition conducted over 100,000 air sorti es 
against Iraq.
1 l 3  
The United States is unlikely to abandon this practice in 
any foreseeable counter-proliferation scenario. 
Th2 Immediacy Requirement. The immediacy requirement poses an in­
stant and severe threat to any U.S. justification of a counter-proliferation 
activi ty based upon the theory of anticipatory self-defense. With the end 
of the Cold War, the risk to the United States from nuclear attack has been 
reducedy4 None of the usual proliferation suspects currently have the 
capacity to strike the Uni ted States. 1 I S  Even the most pessimistic estimates 
believe that another decade will pass before a nation currently hostile to 
U.S. interests will have the capacity to strike the United States with a 
nuclear-tipped ballistic missile. 16 Consequently, the United States would 
have difficulty meeting the first condition of the anticipatory self-defense 
test. 
The United States might argue that although these states cannot place 
the United States at imminent risk of nuclear attack, they might be able to 
threaten both U.S.  allies and U.S .  military forces deployed overseas. Thus, 
according to this reasoning, the counter-proliferation event could meet the 
immediacy requirement. Two problems confront this argument. First, 
while U.S. forces may be deployed overseas, their  presence does not convert 
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the land which they occupy into V.S.  terri tory. A significant difference 
exists between defending V.S.  territory and U.S.  forces, as the former 
represents an elemen t of U.S.  sovereignty, while forces deployed overseas 
do not, in and of themselves, command the same degree oflegal protection. 
Second, if an imminent threat existed against an ally of the Uni ted States, 
that might give the al ly a justification to engage in a counter-proliferation 
strike, but probably would not permit the United States to undertake the 
operation unilaterally. 
For example, to attempt to justify a preemptive attack against North 
Korea's nuclear faciIi ties, the V ni ted S tates would have to d emons trate that 
its counter-proliferation action had met two aspects of the immediacy test. 
First, V . S. leaders would have to estab lish that the North Koreans were o n  
the verge o f  developing a nuclear warhead and that the counter-prolifera­
tion activity had to be conducted immediately to be effective. More i mpor­
tantly, the United States would have to demonstrate that if North Korea 
were permi tted to develop its bomb, it could and would immediately attack 
the United States (an admittedly unlikely scenario ), South Korea, or Japan. 
The United States could argue that the counter-proliferation campaign 
was conducted no t for the defense of the United S tates, but for the defense 
of South Korea and American forces located there. However, as noted 
above, these facts might legitimize a preemptive attack by the South 
Koreans, but might not suffice to justify unilateral American action .  A 
combined U .S.-South Korean attack might pass muster, but the interna­
tional community likely wou ld scrutinize any U.S.  involvement closely. 
Any U.S. A ction Must Respond to an Illegal Activity. To engage legally 
in an act of counter-proliferation, the Uni ted States must demons trate that 
the target state is in breach of some aspect of international law. This 
requirement is met most easi ly when a state is clandestinely developing a 
nuclear warhead i n  violation of i ts commitment to the NPT. However, if 
the state is not an NPT member, or if it has withdrawn from the regime 
pursuant to i ts rights under Article X of the Treaty, 1 1  7 then the United 
States would need to base its co un ter-proliferation activi ty on some broader 
concept found within the body of customary international law. According 
to one official, the U.S.  Department of Defense takes the position that an 
international norm exists which classifies the development of a nuclear 
wea�on by a previously nonnuclear state as a violation of international 
law. 1 8 This theory of international law, however, migh t be unconvincing 
to an i nternational community that perceives a reluctance on the part of 
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the current nuclear powers to reduce thei r arsenals and which has ignored 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons in non·NPT members such as Israel 
and India. Even if the international community has accepted this norm, 
the communi ty has not constructed an effective enforcemen t regi me which 
guaran tees adherence to it. 
In other words, violations of international law are rarely obvious. The 
United States might have to procure a reso lution from the Securi ty Council 
condemning the proliferation activity as a breach of international law to 
justify this element of the preemptive self·defense test . Such condemnation 
might be difficult to obtain and would not occur rapidly. 
Obligation to Exhaust Diplomatic Options. The third obstacle which the 
United States must overcome to justify a preemptive counter·proliferation 
attack i s  the requirement to demonstrate that it had exhausted all reason­
able diplomatic avenues before engaging in mi litary action. This condition 
would prove easier to hurdle if  the state in question completely refused to 
negotiate the prolifera tion issue. However, even the most reclusive pariah 
state normally does not completely isolate i tself from the interna tional 
community. Recen t events involving North Korea d emonstrate this point. 
If negotiations were ongoing but failing to make progress, then the U ni ted 
S tates might be able to argue that the poten tial proliferant was engagi ng in 
stonewalling tactics to delay the i nevi tab le. Unfortunately, i t  is often 
difficult  to discern when negotiations have failed and when they are merely 
stalled. 
The diplomatic exhaustion requirement is not easily fulfilled. Given the 
prominent posi tion of the United States in the international community, 
i t  might prove substantial ly more difficult for the United States to meet 
this requirement than for states of lesser international stature. 
The Proportionality Requirement. The final requirement that the test for 
preemptive self·defense imposes upon a state engaging in a counter·prolif· 
eration attack is that i t use no more force than necessary to accomplish i ts 
mission . This requirement, which seems only reasonable in diplomati c 
circles, is not necessarily consistent wi th current U.S. mili tary dogma. 
When the Uni ted S tates employs force, it often does so redundantly. In 
other words, the United States tends to apply more force than the mini­
mum necessary to guarantee that i t  accomplishes i ts military ob jectives. 
For example, in the Persian Gulf conflict, " [t]he Pentagon explained i ts 
strategy as applying overwhelming force at maximum efficiency. Coalition 
leaders were intent on achieving their objectives with minimum Coalition 
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casualties and maximum combat efficiency. If combat operations became 
necessary, the concept was to apply overwhelmi ng force.,, 1 1 9 From a 
military perspective this strategy is sensible, because a military failure often 
is worse than not attempti ng to accomplish the mission in the first place. 
However, the use of "overwhelming" force to attain a military objective can 
create problems for the United States within th e international community. 
In the context of anticipatory self-defense, it could be thought to violate 
international law. 
U .S. military capab ilities might assist in the fulfillment of the require­
ment, as the imposition of more force does no t lead invariab ly to more 
destruction.  Precision-guided mu nitions, for example, could destroy the 
target without causing extensive damage to the surrounding area. The 
international legal standard for proportionality is unclear in this regard. 
Does the standard prevent overwhelming force or overwhelming damage? 
If the use of disproportionate force does not result in disproportionate 
destruction, then the United States might b e able to satisfy this require­
ment. 
A condition related to the proportionality requiremen t considers the 
type of force applied in a given situation.  The degree of force should not 
exceed the minimum necessary to accomplish the desired task. In other 
words, if the U nited States could reaso nably expect to employ a successful 
nonviolent counter-proliferation approach, by the standards of interna­
tional law it must attempt to do so b efore engaging in a violent attack. Thus 
this argu ment holds that, if possib le, the Uni ted States should attempt to 
sabotage the weapons program of a proliferant through th e introduction of 
a computer virus, for example, b efore bombing the proliferant's weapons 
development facilities .  
Conclusions Regarding the Legality of Counte r-Pro l i feration Pursuant 
to the I nte rnational Law of Anticipato ry Se lf-Defense 
The requirements a state must satisfy to justify an act of anticipatory 
self-defense are stri ngent. They seek to prevent states from disguising 
unnecessary and illegitimate military attacks as acts of self-defense. The 
United States would face a daunting task to convince the international 
communi ty that a violent act of counter-proliferation fell squarely withi n 
the legal requirements of the test for antici patory self-defense. I t is di fficult 
to imagine many states accep ting U .S. explanations that i t  was under the 
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threat of imminent attack by a Third World s tate producing i ts first nuclear 
weapon. 
Beyond the i mminence requirement lie the o ther requirements of 
preemptive self-defense. When examined collectively, they make it  diffi­
cult to fathom how the United States could legally justify a coun ter-prolif­
eration activity on the basis of anticipatory self-defense. This legal 
conclusion, however, should not (and will not) be the only factor U.S.  
leaders consider when deciding whether to engage i n  an act of counter-p ro­
liferation. The international community condemned Israel for its attack of 
Tamuz 1 . 1 20 However, in retrospect, it is doub tful that the government of 
Israel or other members of the international community regret that at­
tack. 1 2 1  As Prime Minister Menachem Begin declared, "Despite all the 
condemnations in the last twenty- four hours, Israel has nothing to apolo­
gize for. It was a just cause. And it shall yet triumph ; . . .  it was an act of  
supreme moral and national self-defense.,, 1 22 The legal analysis, therefore, 
should not be dispositive when analyzing the counter-proliferation equa­
tion . Like Menachem Begin in 1 98 1 ,  U .S. leaders must determi ne whether 
the condemnation of the international community is a cos t worth bearing 
to prevent a nation from going nuclear. 
3 7  

VJ[ 
Cou nter-Prol ife ration and the Concept of Reprisa l 
lTF COUNTER-PROLIFERATION is unlikely to meet the requirements of 
Jlanticipatory self-defense, then what  other l egal concept might describe 
a counter-proliferation event? Counter-proliferation perhaps best fits un­
der the rubric of the international legal concept of reprisal . 1 23 However, 
while an act of counter-proliferation might fit within the defini tion of 
reprisal, this fact does not solve the prob lem for a s tate engaging i n  that 
act, for reprisals are per se illegal pursuant to current norms of in ternational 
law. 
The Legal Definition of an Act of Reprisal 
While reprisal and self-defense are related co ncepts, since both are forms 
of self-help, reprisals differ from self-defense because the former are puni­
tive. As Derek Bowett explains : 
The difference between {he two forms of self-help lies essentially in 
their aim or purpose. Self defense is permissible for the purpose of 
protecting the security o f  the state and the essential rights-in particu­
lar the rights of territorial integrity and political independence upon 
which that security depends . In contrast, reprisals are punitive in 
character: they seek to impose reparation for the harm done, or to 
compel a satisfactory settlement of the dispute created by the initial 
illegal act, or to compel the delinquent state to abide by the law in the 
future. 
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I t  is their punitive nature that preclu des the legitimacy of reprisals 
before international law. They co nflict with the language of articles 2(3 ) 
and 2(4) of the U.N.  Charter, which requires that states settle their disputes 
by peaceful means and refrain from the use or threat of the use of force 
agains t o ther states. Thus, one commentator explains : "The general view 
is that articles 2(3)  and 2(4) of the U .N. Charter have ou tlawed peacetime 
reprisals. U.N.  General Assemb ly resolutions have called on s tates to 
refrain from i ts [sic] use., ,1 25 
The prohibition against peaceti me reprisals reflects the in ternational 
community's desire to avoid conflict between states despite the possible 
legi timacy of a claim by one state against another. The hope of  the fou nders 
of the United Nations was that disputing parties would bring their claims 
to either the U.N. Security Council or the International Court of Justice 
for peaceful settlement instead of  engaging in destructive military opera­
tions to settle the score.
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To further this aspiration, the language of the 
Charter i mplicitly forbids the use of reprisals . 
Five reaso ns are commonly given to explain the general condemnation 
of reprisals . As Richard J. Erickson s tates, "First, forcible reprisal is a 
remedy available only to the strong over the weak. Second, i t  allows the 
injured state to both judge the wrong done against it and extract the 
reparation for that wrong. Third, reprisals connote an eye for an eye, 
revenge, and retaliation. Fourth, reprisals tend to embi tter relations among 
states . Fifth, reprisals can result in counter-reprisals and escalation of the 
use of force between states.,,
1 27 
The tes t to determine whether a mili tary strike qualifies as a reprisal 
. h I 1 28 F ' N '  X . . 1 con tams t ree e emen ts. lrst, anon mus t commI t a nonVIO ent 
wrong against the interests of Nation Y. Second, N atio n Y must respond 
to this vio lation of its interest and i nternational law by taking military 
action agai nst Nation X to punish Nation X for its unlawful act and to have 
Nation X change its behavior. Third, Nation V's military action must not 
fit within the acceptable legal definition of the right of self-defense. 
Counter- Prol iferation and Reprisals 
Any counter-proliferation activity conducted by the United States al­
mos t  certainly would fall  within the legal definition of reprisal. The strike 
would meet the three requirements set forth in the reprisal defi nition. 
First, the U nited States would perceive a legal wrong to i ts interes ts, in this 
case a violation of the putative norm against proliferation. Second, by 
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employing military force the United States would attempt to coerce the 
target state to modify i ts policy. Finally, for the reasons outlined above, the 
U.S.  action would not fit within the confines of the definition of a state 
undertaking an act of preemptive s elf-defense. 
The Violation of International Law by the Target Stare . The situation in 
North Korea, despite  the recent agreement with the U nited States and 
South Korea, provides a good example of how this analysis might apply. If 
the goal of i ts nuclear program were to construct a warhead, then North 
Korea would be in violation of i ts international treaty commitmen ts by 
breaching the N]7f. Even if  North Korea were to withdraw from the NPT, 
i ts development of a nuclear warhead conceivably would violate a pre­
sumed international legal norm prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Thus, the development program, as a prima facie violation of 
international law, would satisfy the first  stipulation of the reprisal test. 
The Response to the Violation. It is possible that in response to the alleged 
North Korean violation, the United States, unab le to obtain the results it  
desires diplomatically and unable to convince the Chinese, for example, of 
the n eed for multilateral economic sanctions against North Korea, would 
conclude that it mu st  take effective action to punish the North Koreans for 
their v iolations of both the NYf and the nonproliferation norm . Thus, the 
United S tates would attack those facil i ti es which i t  believed were an 
integral part of the North Korean weapons development program . 
The United States could support its action by employing two justifica­
tions.  First, the United S tates could note that a North Korea in possession 
of a nuclear warhead would have posed an unacceptable threat to South 
Korea, Japan, and to American forces deployed throughout Asia. S econd, 
the United States could assert that its attack will  deter other potential 
proliferants from continuing their weapons development programs. These 
other nations, in effect, should learn the lesson that the United States will  
not tolerate nuclear proliferation and punishes those s tates that fai l  to heed 
their commitments to the NPT and to the in ternational norm against 
proliferation. In this s cenario, the counter-proliferation event passes the 
punishment element of the test for reprisal. 
The Concept of Reprisal 1JeTsus the Concept of Self-Defense. While the 
United S tates could argue that it  conducted i ts counter-p roliferation activ­
i ty to defend U.S .  forces deployed ab road, that argument is unlikely to 
succeed in classifying the action as one of self-defense for the reasons 
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outlined in Chapter V above. In these circums tances, the third stipulation 
of the test would be satisfied, and the United States would have committed 
an act of reprisal. In other words, the U nited States would have violated 
current international law and undermined its position within the interna­
tional community. The United States might be willing to accept some 
international condemnation if it b elieved that the danger represented by a 
North Korean bomb was intolerable. U.S. policy makers may have to make 
that decision, but they should not deliberate under the illusion that, 
pursuant to current law, the international community will  accept the 
legality of the decision . Perhaps if the United States were ab le to form a 
multi lateral coali tion, the action might be legitimate pursuant to article 42 
or article 52  of the U .N. Charter; 1 29 however, as noted previously, forming 
multilateral coali tions to take preemptive action is not an easy task. 
An Exception to the Reprisal Prohibiti on i n  
Orde r t o  Combat Prol ife ration? 
This analysis therefore finds that an act  of counter-proliferation would 
violate current provisions of international law. However, i t  should not 
necessarily be con cluded that the United States should abandon the 
counter-proliferation strategy. The time may have arrived for the interna­
tional community to carve out an exception to the prohib ition against 
reprisals in order to combat th e proliferation of weapons of mass destruc­
tion. Multiple arguments in favor of the creation of such an exception exist. 
However, strong arguments against the estab lishment of an exception also 
exist. Both sides of the debate need to be examined. 
Arguments in Favor of an Exception. Three arguments favor the creation 
of a reprisal exception. First, the destructive power of nuclear weapons 
makes their development a far greater threat to international peace and 
security than any other potential transgression of international law. The 
international community needs radi cal solutions to prevent states from 
acquiring these devi ces . Ob taining an effective intern ational consensus 
that resolves the prob lem of proliferation has proven difficult in the past 
and is unlikely to b ecome any easier in the near future. Thus, to preserve 
the norm against proliferation, it is i mportant to give states greater leeway 
to take reprisals against those states i llicitly developing nuclear warheads. 
Second, the international legal norms developed in the aftermath of 
World War II do not adequately address the challenges of th e New World 
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O rder. In an era when fears of rampant proliferation are prominent, the 
tim e  has arrived to reconsider the international preference for the absence 
of conflict over jus tice. 1 30 If nonproliferation provides the only j ustifiab le 
course of the international community, then i ts memb ers must have the 
requisite tools to combat the threat of the illicit acquisi tion of nuclear 
weapons . 1 3  I Counter-proliferation, the argument runs, represen ts the mos t 
effective tool to combat the spread of these weapons. 
Third, while reprisals may be illegal pursuant to intemational law, they 
do occur.B2 In fact, the international communi ty frequently fails to con­
demn them. Anthony Clark Arend observes that : 
[W]hile states are formally unwilling to depart from the Charter 
paradigm, in j ustifying their actions they have expanded the notion of 
self-defense to include deterrence and even punishment. Such a broad­
ened notion of self-defense, while perhaps politically and even morally 
commendable, seems to be clearly at variance with the Charter's ideal 
of peace over iustice.
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Perhaps it is time to admit that the norm against reprisals has become 
archaic and that the internatio nal community should fashion an updated 
norm, which recognizes that reprisals have become accepted de facto, 
perm itting limited reprisals against the most dangerous proliferants. 
Arguments against an Exception. The arguments against estab lishing an 
exception to the reprisal prohibition hinge on the traditional reasoning 
that it would lead to an explosion of unchecked violence throughou t the 
world. According to this position, it would be impossible to limit an 
exception to the nonproliferation context. Maintaining the current inter­
national law on reprisals is preferable to creating the inevitable "slippery 
slope" that an exception would produce, and the costs of estab lishing a 
reprisal exception greatly exceed any potential b enefits . An exception 
would create a l icense to commit violence and wou ld discriminate against 
the weaker states of the international com munity. 
This argument also posits that despi te the meri ts of a coun ter-prolifera­
tion strategy, it is inherently imperialistic. Establishi ng an exception for 
reprisals against proliferation would condone such imperialis m. An excep­
tion would create a tool only for the strong and would violate  the rights of 
weaker Third World nations . Furthermore, an exception would contain an 
element of hypocrisy, as those s tates calling for i ts creation would b e the 
very s tates that currently possess nuclear arsenals or which are allied to the 
nuclear powers . 
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The creation of an exception also would undermine the current nonpro­
liferation regime that it seeks to protect. The exception would demonstrate 
that the goals of the NPf had failed, and would show that the nuclear-weap­
ons states have become unwilling to satisfy their treaty commitments. This 
might cause the collapse of the nonproliferatio n regime, leading s tates to 
deny inspection rights to the !AEA. States might feel compelled to place 
their nuclear programs underground, both Ii terally and figuratively, where 
they would be safer from attack. 
On a more cynical note, the United States may desire that these types of 
reprisals remain legally unacceptable, and yet conduct them nonetheless, 
reasoning that the gain from preventing the potential proliferant from 
obtaining a nuclear warhead dram atically outweighs the political toll 
incurred for violating the reprisal prohibition. The prohib ition against 
reprisals would be sustained, theoretically preventing other states, which 
may possess interests adverse to those of the United States, from engaging 
in similar acts .  In essence, the United States, like Israel before it, would 
accept condemnation as a type of international "cost of doing business" in 
an attempt to have it  both ways, maintai ning the norms against both 
proliferation and reprisal. 
Conclusions on Self-Defense and Reprisal 
The previous sections have classified counter-proliferation within the 
framework of international law on self-defense and reprisal, concluding 
that the United States would have difficulty justifying an act of counter­
proliferation on the basis of anticipatory self-defense. The requirements of 
anticipatory self-defense are too arduous for a cou nter-proliferation strike 
to meet. Counter-proliferation fits more readily into the framework of 
reprisal. However, under current international law, reprisals are illegal. 
Consequently, if the United States wants to pursue this strategy, it must 
either choose to violate current i nternational law or convince the interna­
tional community that the time has come to change the legal norm against 
reprisal in order to supply that com munity with another instrument in i ts 
ongoing campaign against nuclear proliferation. 
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Cou nter-Prol iferation and Wa r 
T
HE PREVIOUS SECTIONS of this study have concentrated on the use of 
counter-proliferation measures as a tool to prevent the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons before the outbreak of war between a state developing a 
nuclear weapon and those opposed to that produ ction. This section focuses 
on the problem during a time of war. 134 To what  exten t are counter-pro­
liferation efforts acceptable in the  wartime setting? This question grew in 
importance with the recent review of U.S.  war plans in  preparation for the 
possible outbreak of hostilities with North Korea. 1 35 
The Clin ton administration is studying questions surrounding counter­
proliferation in other regions as weB, "ordering regional commanders to 
develop detailed plans for thwarting proliferation threats i n  their areas, 
among other measures.,,1 36 For example, i n  the event of a conflict between 
the United States and Iran, U.S.  military officials will need to address the 
Iranian weapons development program. The issue of what action to take 
against nuclear faciIi ties in a time of war also could occur i f a second conflict 
with Iraq were to break out .  The United S tates, under the auspices of the 
United Nations, showed little reluctance during the 199 1 Gulf War in 
striking the Iraqi nuclear program. Would the U nited States, acting alone 
or as part of a U.N.-sanctioned coalition, be justified in attacking Iraq's 
nuclear program a second time? 
The pages that follow explore these questions from a legal perspective, 
concen trating on lessons drawn from three sources : customary interna­
tional law, international accords on the law of armed conflict, and the 
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precedent of earlier conflicts . Unlike the previous sections o f  this study, 
which focused on international law regarding resort to the use of force (jus 
ad bellum), this section centers on the legal ramifications of the use of 
counter-proliferation measures during a time of war. Thus, an under­
standing of the laws of war (jus in bello), which limit the permissible military 
activities offorces embroiled i n  combat, is crucial.  The Hague Convention 
of 1 907,
137 
the Geneva Conventions of 1 949,
1 38 and the 1 977 Additional 
Protocols to these Conventions
1 39 
are particularly important, for these 
documents provide the most comprehensive representation of the current 
state of thinking regarding the laws of war. 
These legal issues merit discussion because the United States depends 
on the international legal regime during periods of both peace and war. If 
the United States were to become embroiled in hostilities which required 
the use of counter-proliferations methods, it would want to conduct those 
efforts within the framework of the laws of war to maintain favorable 
standing within the international community. A wartime counter-prolif­
eration endeavor would be far more likely to receive broad international 
support if the U ni ted States were to follow the requirements of the laws of 
h ' f ' . I h 1 40 war t an 1 11 were to VIO ate t ese norms. 
The Customary Laws of War 
The core legal principles which address the acceptability of attacks 
against military targets under the traditional laws of war have developed 
gradually over the centuries. However, through multilateral accords on the 
laws of war, the international communi ty, particularly since the conclusion 
of World War II, has narrowed the range of targets legally subject to attack . 
Thus, while the basic test to determine the legality of attacks has remained 
essentially the same, the list of types of targets passing that standard has 
dwindled in an attempt to prevent civilian casualties. 
Necessity. A two-part test identifies the requisite characteristics a target 
must possess before a belligerent may attack it. First, the target mus t 
possess some military value. The customary international laws of war, as 
well as subsequent international conventions, prohibit attacks against 
targets po ssessing li ttle or no military value. For example, indiscriminate 




The test to determine whether an objecti ve is a legitimate military target 
depends upon the contribution i ts destruction would make to the ultimate 
outcome of the war. As L.c. Green explai ns : 
[T]he decision whether an objective is legitimate or not depends upon 
the contribution an attack on that objective will make to ultim ate 
victory or the success of the operation of which the attack is pan. But 
with objects normally devoted to civilian use, such as schools, hosp itals 
or places of worship, if there is any doubt they are being used for such 
purposes or being put to military use, they shall receive the benefit of 
the doubt and not be subjected to attack . l�2 
However, tradi tional interpreta tions of the necessi ty requiremen t have 
given nations wide latitude to conduct attacks against a broad range of 
targets, including, for example, enemy merchant ships and steel mines . 143 
Belligerents have not found the necessity requirement difficult to satisfy. 
Proportionality. In addition to the requirement that a nation conduct its 
attack against a military objective, the extent of that attack must be 
proportionate to the amoun t of force needed to destroy the target. Thus, 
"[ e ]ven if the destruction of a target satisfies the test of military necessity, 
excessive damage should be prohibited. ,,1 44 The justification for this p art 
of the test is tha t it serves the goal of preven ting unnecessary suffering on 
the part of noncombatants. The test  to determine whether the force em­
ployed has been excessive is objective. 145 In other words, a nation may use 
that amount of force necessary to accomplish its mission wh ich a reason­
ab le nation would employ to accomplish a simi lar task. Hence, "it is  not a 
breach of  the law of armed conflict if civi lians suffer injury inci dental to 
attack upon a lawful military objective, so long as such incidental injury is 
not disproportionate to the military objective which it is sought to 
achieve . . . . ,, 146 
Internati onal Conventions on the Laws of War 
The treaties and conventions dealing with the laws of war codify the 
customary requirements of necessi ty and proportionali ty. For examp le, 
the requirement of necessi ty may be found in Arti cle 23(g) of the 1 907 
Hague Convention, which prohibits nations from taking action "[t]o 
destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destructio n or seizure 
b e  imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. ,,1 47 The 1 949 Geneva 
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Conventions echo this necessity requirement. 1 48 The proportionality re­
quirement also has been codified i nto the conventional law of war. 
The principle of proponionality is embodied in Anicle 23(e) and (g) 
of the Annex to the Hague Convention No. IV of 1 907 . In addition, it 
is contained in several provisions of the 1977 Protocol I: Article 25, the 
first anicle of the section on m ethods and means of warfare, prohibits 
in paragraph 2 the employment of weapons, projectiles and material 
and methods of warfary Sf a nature to cause 'superfluous' injury or 'unnecessary' suffering. 4 
Lessons 
The primary lesson military strategists should draw from both the 
customary and conventional provisions of the law of war is that attacks 
against any type of target must meet certain requirements. First, the strike 
must occur against only those targets that reasonably merit attack. An 
attack designed to destroy an enemy's economic infrastructure, for exam­
ple, must bear some rational relationship to a military obj ective. Second, 
the attack must not cause damage that leads to enormous civilian casualties 
or other suffering. The intensi ty of the attack must correspond reasonably 
with the minimum amount of force necessary to ensure the accomplish­
ment of the mi litary mission. The mili tary planner of a counter-prolifera­
tion mission during a time of war must keep these dictates in mind when 
deciding on, and devising, such an attack. 
Protocol I 
Parti cularly i mportant to the discussion of counter-proliferation in the 
wartime setting is the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Convention of 1949.
1 50 This document outlines the requirements which 
combatants must follow when engaged in armed conflict. Article 56 of the 
Protocol specifically addresses the targeting of nuclear reactors during 
confli ct, restricting the ability of belligerents to attack installations that 
could release "dangerous forces" if destroyed. Other articl es of the Protocol 
prohibit reprisals against civilians (Article 5 1 )  and attacks causing exces­
sive harm to the environment (Arti cle 35). 1 5 1  
Complicating an?; analysis of  Protocol I i s  the fact that the United S tates 
has not ratified it. 1 2 President Ronald Reagan decided not to submit the 
Protocol to the Senate for ratification. In his letter to the Senate declaring 
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that he would not send the Protocol for ratification, President Reagan 
stated, "[Protocol I] contains provisions that would undermine human i­
tarian law and endanger civilians in war. One o f  its provisions, for exam pIe, 
would automatically treat as an international conflict any so-called 'war of 
national liberation.' . . . Finally, the Joint Chiefs of S taff have also con­
cluded that a number of the provisions of the Protocol are militarily 
unacceptable." l S3 
Despite the fact that the United States has not ratified the Protocol, 
several reasons warrant a study of i ts provi sions. First, the United States i s  
a signatory to the ProtocoL 1 S4 As suchl �ursuant to Article 1 8  of the Vienna 
Convention on th e Law of Treaties, S the United States "is obliged to 
refrain from acts which would defeat [the Protocol's] object and pur­
pose . . .  until it shall  have made its intention clear not to become a party 
to the treaty.,,
1 56 President Reagan 's statement to the Senate might suffice 
as a clear proclamation that the United States did not intend to abide by 
Proto col I's provisions. However, i t  is also possible that this internal U.S. 
government communication did not provide adequate notice to the o ther 
parties of the Protocol that this country did not intend to ab ide by i ts 
provisions.  It is possible that either the present or a future admi nistration 
will submit the Protocol to the Senate for ratification. Moreover, according 
to the U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Colin Powell noted that the law of war, including Protocol I, influenced 
decisions throughout the execution of the Persian Gulf War. 1 S7 Such 
consideration demonstrates that the Protocol has at least some influence 
on U.S. policy makers. 
Although the United States has not ratified the Pro tocol
} 
several mem­
bers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N ato) have. S8 Since some 
Nato members are considering participation in the counter-proliferation 
initiative, 
l S9 
the limits placed on the members of Nato by Protocol I should 
concern U.S. military p lanners . Furthermore, South Korea, a key U .S . ally 
in Asia, has ratified the Protocol . 160 Final ly, while the  Protocol may 
contain flaws, it can provide useful guidance to military strategists on the 
limits of mili tary force in the counter-proliferation equation. 
Article 56 . The key provision of the Protocol for the counter-proliferation 
discussion is Article 56, whi ch states, in part: 
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, 
dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the 
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attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe 
losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located 
at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made 
the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous 
forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses 
among the civilian population. 
2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall 
cease: 
. . .  (b) for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides 
electric power in regular, significant and direct support of m ilitary 
operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate 
such support. 
(c) for other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these 
works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant 
and direct support of mil itary operations and if such attack is the 
only feasible way to terminate such support . . . .  
5. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavor to avoid locating any 
military objectives in the vicinity of the works or installations men­
tioned in paragraph 1 .  Nevertheless, installations erected for the sale 
purpose of defending the protected works or installations from attack 
are permissible and shall not themselves be made the object of attack, 
provided that they are not used in hostilities except for defensive 
actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected works or 
installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable 
only of repelling hostile action against the protected works or installa­
tions . . . , 
The language of this article may place significant res trictions on a nation 
contemplating the destruction of the mos t attractive targets in a counter­
proliferation scenario. However) the scope of the article is the subject of 
intense debate) and its meaning requires a thorough examination of i ts 
somewhat confusing text. 16 1 
While the article protects "dams) dykes and nuclear electrical generating 
stations)" this list is not intended to be exhaustive) because the article is 
designed to protect any facility containing a "dangerous force" that could) 
if the facility were destroyed, cause "severe loss among the civilian popu­
lation." Thus, an initial reading of the article appears to demonstrate that 
its language may protect a nuclear reprocessing p lant containing fission­
able material or a nuclear reactor devoted solely to the production of 
weapons-grade plutonium) since the destruction of such facilities could 
release radioactive material. This interpretation is  reinforced by noting 
that even i f  the facil i ty were used exclusively for mili tary purposes) and 
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therefore normally would be a legitimate target, it does not necessarily 
sacrifice its protection from attack
6 
as "even . . .  military objectives" fall  
within the language of the arti cle.
l 2 
However, b efore concluding that all nuclear faci lities are off-limits, one 
must take the analysis of Article 56 a s tep further. As Burrus Carnahan 
notes, " there is no international standard for determining when civilian 
casualties b ecome 'severe'; the party attacking a nuclear power station and 
the party defending it are l ikely to have very d ifferent ideas on that 
subject.,, 1 63 The article allows an exception to the prohibition for attacks 
upon a "nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric  
power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and 
if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support." This 
phrase appears to allow an attack upon a nuclear reactor supplying power 
to a belligerent's armed forces; however, this provision is silent on attacks 
against other nuclear facili ties if they provide fissionab le material to a 
bell igerent's weapons development program. 164 The article contai ns an 
exception allowing attacks against "other mili tary objectives located at or 
in the vicini ty of these works or i nstal lations only if they are used in regular, 
s ignificant and direct support o f  military operations . . . .  " However, this 
provision addresses attacks upon weapons systems, such as artil lery and 
surface-to-air missiles, devo ted to the defense of the facili ty containing the 
dangerous force. Consequently, the definition of "other mi litary objec­
tives" would not appear to include a reprocessing or an enrichmen t  plant. 
Not surprisingly, scholars have come to varying conclusions regarding 
Article 56  and i ts exceptio ns. Antho ny Leib ler, for example, believes that 
" the exceptions in Article 56 are discrete, specific and leave minimal scope 
for divergent interpretation. ,,
16S 
On the other hand, W. Hays Parks b e­
lieves that the article does not prohib it attacks against nuclear facilities 
utilized in a weapons development program, 166 while Burrus Carnahan 
simply concludes that " Article 56 seems more likely to pro duce confusion 
and mutual recrimination than any genuine protection for civilian popu-
I · · . ,, 1 67 anons In wartlme. 
Article 56 does not es tabl ish whether attacks against facilities dedicated 
to the developmen t of nuclear weapons are permitted. The language of this 
provision is too clouded to conclude definitively whether attacks against 
these facilities are prohib ited. States which are parties to the Protocol will 
have to examine the question closely to determine an appropriate action. 
From this analysis, one may conclude that a nation employing a counter­
proliferation measure which attacks a facility containing nuclear material 
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will face allegations that it, in  fact, has violated Protocol ! .  The Uni ted 
States may point to two factors to defend itself should it be subjected to 
such scrutiny. First, the U nited States, as noted above, has not ratified the 
Protocol, and consequently, its provisions should not apply to this cou ntry. 
Second, U.S. policy makers could note that the "rules embodied in Article 
56 are not (at present) incorporated into customary international law.,, 168 
Hence, the United S tates might argue that it may attack a belligerent's 
facility containing a dangerous force so long as that facility is a legitimate 
military objective. 
While the United States may be able to defend itself adequately against 
allegations that it had violated Article 56, some of its al lies that are 
memb ers of Protocol I may face a more daunting task in defending them­
selves from similar allegations. South Korea, for example, as a member of 
the Protocol, may not be able to justify an attack agai nst a North Korean 
nuclear facility if a restrictive interpretation of Article 56 is accepted . This 
fact could represent a substantial obstacle for any U.S .  counter-prolifera­
tion endeavor against North Korea which involves the deployment of 
South Korean forces. If these forces are prevented from striking the North 
Korean nuclear program, it would then become questionable whether an 
ally which has come to the aid of South Korea, e.g., the U nited States, could 
attack the North's facilities in its stead. Similar concerns could face the 
Nato alliance if it were to take a counter-proliferation action against the 
weapons development programs of, for example, either Iran or I raq. 
Moreover, Article 85(3) specifies that a "grave b reach" of the Protocol 
has transpired when a wilful attack releasing a dangerous force occurs 
against a facility protected by Article 56. 169 Article 85(5) of the Protocol 
states that such grave b reaches "shall be regarded as war crimes ." Thus, a 
breach of Article 56 could lead to serious consequences against those who 
ordered an attack resulting i n  the release of a dangerous force. Additionally, 
Article 9 1  of the Protocol mandates that offenders pay compensation to 
illegally attacked states. 
Other Articles of Protocol I. Since Article 56 itself appears inconclusive 
regarding the permissibility of attacks against nuclear facilities, i t  becomes 
important to examine other articles of the Protocol to determine whether 
they can shed light on the issue. Again, while the U nited States has not 
ratified this accord, its provisions must have some i nfluence upon the 
international communit?'
1 
since as of 1992 seventy-eight nations had either 
ratified or  acceded to it. 0 
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Article 57(2) (a) (ii) of the Protocol codifies the principle of proportion-
I, &: d ' " 1 1 17 1  b 'd ' h a t ty loun m customary m ternatlona aw, y provl mg t at:  
[T]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall , , , take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view 
to avoiding, and in any event of minimising, incidentaljoss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects,1 2 
The importance of this provision is enhanced when one evaluates it in 
relation to Article 35(3)  of the Protocol, which proh ibits the employment 
of "methods or means of warfare which are i ntended, or may b e expected, 
to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environ­
ment,, , 173 Unfortunately, the latter provision contains no explicit defi ni­
tion of wh at constitutes "severe damage to the natural environment.,,
174 
However, a significant release of radiation or radioactive material whi ch 
contaminates the surrounding area presumably would qualify as the type 
of "severe d amage" con templated by Article 35 , As with the language of 
Article 5 6, a breach of Article 3 5  by a party to the Protocol could lead to 
severe consequences against those ordering and participating in an attack 
against a nuclear facili ty that released signi ficant amounts of nuclear fallout 
upon destruction.  
Article 5 2(2) of the Protocol provides a definition of what constitutes a 
military objective, thereby codifying the customary international law re­
quirement of mili tary necessity. Attacks are "limited to those objects which 
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
mili tary action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutrali­
zation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage." Like the customary international requirement of necessi ty, the 
Protocol I standard is  objective, demanding that an at tack er employ rea­
soned judgmen t when deciding which targets to attack. 
Other Attempts to Protect Nuclear Faci l ities 
In addition to the provisions of Protocol I, other diplomatic efforts to 
estab lish accords to protect nuclear facilities from attack have transpired. 
None of these attempts have been successful; however, a portion of the 
international communi ty has shown in terest in es tablishing some type of 
convention prohibiting attacks against nuclear facili ties, and thus, these 
efforts merit a brief discussion . 
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Swedish Proposals for a Treaty Prohibiting Radiological Weapons and 
the Release or Dissemination of Radioactive Material for Hostile Pur­
poses . In 1980, the government of Sweden proposed a treaty that would 
protect nuclear facili ties from attack during hostilities.
175 
This initiative 
would have prevented both the use of radioactive material as a weapon as 
well as attacks against facilities that might release radioactive material . 176 
The facili ties protected by the accord were to have been listed on a register 
and subject to inspection by a multilateral agency similar to the IAEA.  
The Swedish plan has not been accepted. As Burrus Carnahan argues, 
the United States has been particularly vocal in its opposition to the plan : 
The United States and its allies have refused to accept the inclusion of 
attacks on nuclear facilities in a radiological weapons convention, and 
Sweden and its supponers have insisted that this problem be covered. 
The Swedish proposal poses practical military p roblems, not the least 
of which are that it protects facilities that are legitimate military targets 
and would never permit an attack on a pro;ected nuclear facility if 
radiation in any amount would be released. I7 
A second problem facing the Swedish proposal is that it  would depend 
upon the credibility of safeguard inspections similar to those that have 
sought to protect the integrity of the NPT. Given the haphazard record of 
IAEA inspections in Iraq and the difficulties the IAEA has faced in guaran­
teeing North Korea's NPT compliance, it is unlikely that the international 
community would have much confidence in such a regime. 
Other discussions have occurred which have had the goal of creating a 
ban on the use of radiological weapons. If adopted, such an agreement, 
known as the Radiological Weapons Convention, not only would prohibit 
the use of weapo ns such as the neutron bomb, but also would ban attacks 
against facilities which could result in the release of radiation. A counter­
proliferation attack against a nuclear facility would run afoul of such an 
accord. As yet, no agreement has been reached on the Radiological Weap­
ons Convention, so attacks against these facilities have not been explicitly 
banned. 
The NPT Review Conferences . Every five years the signatory states to the 
NPT hold a review conference to discuss issues relating to the treaty. At  
both the 1 985 and 1990 conferences, the parties addressed the topic of 
attacks against nuclear facilities. 178 Egypt presen ted a paper at the 1 985 
conference linking attacks on nuclear facilities to articles III  and IV of the 
treaty. 17
9 
Article III details the estab lishment of the safeguards regime 
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under the NPT, while article IV gives each party to the treaty the right to 
pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While the final conference report 
did not accept all aspects of the Egyptian proposal, it did s tate that an attack 
on a safeguarded faci li ty would necessitate immediate U.N.  Security Coun-
' 1  . 1 80 Cl attentlon. 
The 1 990 review conference did not release a final report due to a dispute 
among the parties regarding the proposed adoption of a comprehensive b an 
on the testing of nuclear warheads. However, "'[i]f a final declaration had 
been adopted, the 1 990 review conference would have encouraged all 
parties to provide immediate assistance to any other party to the treaty 
whose safeguarded nuclear faci lities were attacked, and would also have 
appealed to all s tates to consider the danger of releasing radioactivi ty when 
reviewing their mili tary doctrines. ,, 1 8 1  
While none of these initiatives has succeeded in  estab lishing a prohibi­
tion against attacks on nuclear facilities, the possibility exists that the topic 
may be addressed again in the future, particularly if an attack on a nuclear 
facili ty were to occur, resulting in the release of significan t amounts of 
radiation. The United States and i ts allies may face the prospect that some 
aspect of international law may expressly forb id strikes agains t nuclear 
faci li ties. Currently, the norms of the cus tomary international law of war 
dictate that any attack agains t  a nuclear facility not cause disproportionate 
damage to either the environment or noncomb atants . 
The Precedents 
At least three incidents have occurred in the nuclear age in which 
weapons develop ment facil i ties have come under attack during a time of 
war, not including the 198 1 Israeli attack on Tamuz I discussed earlier. 
Th e three instances of attack were the Allied air strikes on the German 
ato mic bomb program during World War I I, at tacks by I ran and Iraq upon 
one another's nuclear facilities duri ng their war between 1 980 and 1988, 
and the attacks conducted by U.S .-led coalition forces against Iraqi nuclear 
facili ties during the Gulf War of 1 99 1 . 
A llied Attacks against Nazi Atomic Facilities . During World War II ,  
Allied forces conducted air  strikes against German atomic facili ties located 
in Norway. I82 The Germans were using these facilities to produce the 
heavy water needed for the production of an atomic bomb . I 8  The Allied 
attacks, which occurred prior to the signing of the Geneva Conventions 
55 
The Newport Papers 
and Protocol I, were subject to the customary requirements of necessity 
and proportionality. 
Given the scope of the war and the need to prevent the construction of 
a German bomb, i t  is hard to dispute the need to attack these facilities. The 
existence of a German bomb could have altered the course of the war in 
Europe, perhaps compelling the Allies to settle with the Germans instead 
of striving for total victory. Hence, the All ied attacks satisfied the first 
element of the customary international law test. The Allies also fulfilled 
the proportionality requirement of this test. The destruction of the heavy 
water facilities did not release great amounts of radioactive material that 
could have caused severe civi lian casualties in Scandinavia or throughout 
Europe. 
Given the need for and the scope of the All ied efforts, it is probable that 
the attacks on the German facilities would have fulfilled the requirements 
of Article S6 of Protocol I had they existed during World War 11 . 184 First, 
the heavy water facilities did not possess the type of "dangerous forces" 
contemplated by the article. Second, even if they had, the need to attack 
the facilities as a military objective would have fit within the exception of 
Article 56(2)(c) .  Moreover, the attacks would have fit within the confines 
of both Article 52 on necessity and Article 57 on proportionality. 
Attacks against Nuclear Facilities during the Iran-Iraq War. During the 
war between Iran and Iraq, waged from 1 980 to 1988, at various times the 
Iranians attacked Iraqi nuclear facilities .
I SS 
These attacks occurred after 
the signing of Protocol I; however, Iran, although a signatory, had not 
ratified the accord. 186 Theoretically, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties required the Iranians to refrain from actions that 
could have defeated the Protocol's purpose.
1 87 
For that reason, one can 
make the argument that the Iranians violated international law by ignoring 
their treaty commitments and violated Article 56 of Protocol I .  
As for the attacks themselves, assuming that the parties were not con­
strained by the provisions of the Protocol, they too are judged by the 
standards of the customary international law of war, namely the concepts 
of necessity and proportionali ty. As noted above, the necessi ty requiremen t 
of this test is objective. Would a reasonable state similarly situated have 
determined that the Iraqi facilities were a legitimate military objective and 
made such an attack ? An affirmative answer to this question seems appro­
priate. The international community was aware of the Iraqi interest in 
developing a nuclear weapon . Given the danger posed to Iran by the 
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development of an Iraqi nuclear weapon, it is reasonable to conclude that 
targeting the facilities was legitimate. Moreover, even had the attacks been 
conducted solely to destroy the electrical power capacity of Iraq, the 
Iranians could have justified these attacks on the basis of the need to disable 
Iraq's supply of energy to i ts war-sm.taining infrastructure and mili tary 
forces . 
The tes t for proportionali ty presen ts a s tiffer hurdle if the Iranian attacks 
are to be justified. The fact that a debate existed about the presence of 
nuclear material at the Iraqi facilities assists in justifying the I ranian action. 
Had the Iraqi nuclear facilities unmistakab ly possessed the type of "dan­
gerous forces" con templated by Article 56 of the Protocol, the Iranian 
attacks would be sub ject to closer scrutiny. While Iran had not ratified the 
Protocol, the effects of the attack could have violated the customary 
proportionality requirement. Had there b een a significant re lease of  radia­
tion from the Iraqi facili ties,  i t  could have caused massive civilian casual ties 
(including within Iran); however, given the fact that the Iranians were 
never capable of completely destroying the faciliti es and that the i ntroduc­
tion of a nuclear capability could have changed the war's balance, the 
Iranian attacks pass the proportionality tes t. Fortunately, the attacks did 
not result in the release of significant amounts of radiation over the Iraqi 
countryside. Had such a calamity occurred, the analysis regarding the 
legali ty of the operation might have differed. 
In light of this analysis, the attacks against the I raqi facili ties appear 
legitimate. As Frits Kalshoven concludes : 
There is . . .  little evidence that customary law already prohibits at­
tacks on nuclear power stations other than in terms of the general 
principles for the protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects . It seems therefore safe to conclude that as between the parties 
to the [Iran-Iraq] Gulf War, an attack on a nuclear power station would 
have been perfectly proper if there were sufficient grounds to regard 
the object as a military objective and the attack could be carried out  
without unduly severe losses among the civilian population. I S8 
The Iranian attacks satisfied bo th parts of this test. They should be 
considered legitimate pursuant to the present tenets of customary interna­
tional law. 
A similar analysis applies to Iraqi attacks against  the nuclear fad li ties of 
Iran. The necessi ty and proportionality standards demanded that Iraq 
exercise a reasonable amount of restraint with respect to their attacks 
against Iranian nuclear facilities. Again, as Kalshoven notes, the Iraqi 
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attacks in all likelihood were proper pursuant to the international legal 
. 
f h d 
1 89 
reqUirements 0 t e ay. 
Anacks against Iraqi Nuclear Facilities during "Operation Desen 
Storm. " The U.S .-led coalition repeatedly attacked the nuclear facili ti es of 
Iraq during the Gulf War of 1 99 1 .  U .S. fighter planes bombed two Iraqi 
research reactors located at Tuwaitha.
190 
The U.S .-led coalition conducted 
these attacks to prevent the Iraqis from developing a nuclear device. 
Preventing Iraqi proliferation became one of the major aims of the U ni ted 
States . However, the legitimacy of these attacks s hould be examined. While 
the assumption of the Uni ted States was that they were legitimate, several 
issues should be examined to determine whether the U.S.  conclusion was 
prop er. 
The fi rst question is whether attacks against Iraqi nuclear facilities were 
part of the U.N. mandate to free Kuwait. No specific provision of any 
Security Council Resolution called for the destruction of Iraqi nuclear 
facilities.
191  Security Council Renlution 678 did authorize U .N. members 
to use force "to restore international peace and security,,192 to the region. 
Perhaps this phrase gave the coalition the requisite authority to attack the 
facilities. However, some have ques tioned this assumption. Burrus Carna­
han, for example, suggests that the attacks were not authorized by Resolu­
tion 678, stating that the facili ties targeted were not a major part of the I raqi 
nuclear weapons development program, and hence the attacks were ille­
gitimate exploitations of the Resolution.
1 93 
Settlement of this debate goes 
beyond the scope of this paper.
194 
However, the Resolution did not explic­
itly prevent members of the coalition from employing any type of force 
which they deemed necessary to implement the U.N. mandate.
1 95 
The 
assumption might be that since the U nited Nations did not prohibit these 
attacks, "it is probably fair to say that the U nited States and allied forces 
conducted their operations in accordance with international law.,, 196 
Kuwait and the United States also justified the attacks on the basis of 
collective self-defense pursuant to Article 5 1 of the Charter. Since the 
adversaries were engaged in hostili ties, this action would not fall under the 
rubric of anticipatory self-defense. Rather, th is action would be classified 
within the parameters of traditional, non-anticipatory self-defense. Even 
if this justification were proper, the attacks would be required to meet the 
tests of the laws of war. 
Thus, the analysis returns to the traditional legal p rincip les on the 
laws of war, specifically those regarding the factors of necessity and 
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proportionality. Did U.S. -led forces comply with these requirements when 
conducting their attacks agai nst the Iraqi facilities?  Since the United S tates 
took the lead in these attacks, did it comply with international law during 
the raids ? This discussion is further complicated by the fact that some 
memb ers of the Gulf War coalition had ratified Protocol I, and thus 
theoretically were compelled to follow its provisions, including the man­
dates of Article 56 pertaining to the prohibition on the release of dangerous 
forces . This problem is mitigated to a degree by the fact that two of the 
major participants in the air attacks had not ratified the Protocol. The 
United States and the United Kingdom are not among its members. 
However, both Saudi Arabia, whose forces participated in these attacks and 
from whose territory the attacks were staged, and Kuwait, whose pilots 
participated in the attacks, had ratified the Protocol,
1 97 
thereby endanger­
ing the legality of their participation. 
For the United States, the permissibility of the attacks on the I raqi 
facili ties turns on their legality under the provisions of th e customary 
international law of war. Once again, the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality provide the standards by which such attacks are judged. 
The necessity requirement in this case is met fairly easily, given th e broad 
defini tion of the term "military objective" and th e wide discretion states 
have in determining si tes that qualify as targets sub ject to attack. 198 Since 
U.S. intelligence reports had concluded that the Iraqi facilities were being 
used for weapons research, it was reasonable for the United States to 
conclude that attacking the facilities was necessary. Although the facilities 
at Tuwaitha were subject to IAEA inspection, 1 99 given the Iraqi interest in 
clandestine nuclear weapons development, the attacks were justified. 
The proportionali ty requirement, however, represents a sterner test, for 
a significan t release of radiation from any of the Iraqi nuclear facili ties was 
conceivab le.2OO The United States and i ts Desert Storm allies had to "weigh 
the interests arisi ng from the success of the operation on the one hand, 
against the possib le harmful effect upon protected persons and obj ects on 
the other. There must, therefore, be an acceptable relation between the 
legitimate destructive effect and undesirable collateral consequences.,,
20 1 
The amount of radioactive material at the Iraqi faciliti es subject to release 
by attack was unknown. It may be hoped that the United States and its 
allies seriously considered the possibility of a significant release of radio­
active material b efore engaging in their attacks . If they did, coming to the 
reasonab le conclusion that the potential for significant radioactive release 
was minimal, then the attacks may be considered justified. However, if the 
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United States failed to study the possibility of release, yet targeted the 
facilities nonetheless, the attacks might not pass the proportionality re­
quirement (in spite of the fact that no radiation ultimately leaked), because 
a reasonable nation would have considered the possibility of a radiation 
release. The Iraqis accused the United States of attacking without regard 
to the possibility of the release of radioactive material. U.S. representatives 
denied the accusation.202 
A P roposed Le gal Test fo r Attacks again st Faci lities Contain i ng 
N u clear Mate rial in a Time of War 
Th ese precedents provide several lessons for any nation contemplating 
an attack against ano ther's nuclear facili ties during armed conflict. These 
types of s trikes are not always justified, because they may violate either part 
of the customary intemational law test for permissible attacks, being either 
not necessary or not proportional .  Moreover, if the state has ratified 
Protocol I, it must consider whether Arti cle 56 prohibits such attacks. If 
so, then, at least  for legal purposes, the state must find some alternative 
means to eliminate the adversary's nuclear capab ility. 
For the Uni ted S tates, which is not bound by the language of Article 56, 
the requirements are somewhat easier to satisfy; however, U . S. military 
planners still must ob ey the requirements of the customary international 
law of armed conflict. In Ugh t of this fact, the paragraphs below propose a 
three-part tes t designed to make easier any determination regarding the 
permissibility of an attack. Although other factors may contribute to a 
decision by the United States to attack another nation's nuclear facili ties 
during war, this test will give U.S .  policy makers some idea of the potential 
legal ramifications of their actions . 
Is the Target a Legitimate Military Objective? If the target possesses no 
legitimate mili tary value, then all forms of international law proh ibit an 
attack against i t. U.S.  decision makers must establish that the target b ears 
some rational relationship to the military capabilities of th e adversary. This 
s tandard h istorically has not b een difficult to meet. 203 1f  the target repre­
sents a legitimate military ob jective, despi te the fact that it contains 
fissionable material, th en international law permi ts the attack to this point. 
However, the inquiry does not end here, b ecause the attacker still  must 
satisfy the proportionality requirement. 
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Would the Attack Endanger Noncombatants? If  the target  were in an 
isolated area or if it were possible to destroy the target without causing a 
significant release of radioactive material, then the attack presumably 
would no t endanger the lives of noncombatants on a significant scale. The 
attack would satisfy the proponionality requirement. The isolated location 
of these facilities would make the task ofU .S.  military planners far simpler. 
The attack would pass both the necessity and proportionality stipulations, 
and be legitimate. 
Targets containing fissionable material are rarely in areas devoid of 
civilians. Often such facilities are located in areas with large popUlations.  
Furthermore, i t might prove difficult to des troy the facili ty with confi­
dence withou t accepting some chan ce that the attack would release at least 
some radioactive material. If such a release were to occur, planners must 
consider meteorological conditions in their calculations regarding an at­
tack's permissibility. The question then turns on the exten t of material 
released and the numb er of casualties reasonably expected due to the 
facility's destruction. 
Are the Likely Casualties Disproportionate to the Need to Destroy the 
Facility? A high likelihood that destruction of a nuclear facility would 
produce severe civilian casualties would suggest that such an attack would 
violate international law. The losses would be out of proportion with the 
need to attack unless some overwhelming justification could be demon­
strated. For the United States, such a requirement might prove virtually 
impossible to m eet. The main tenance of the nuclear status quo would not 
justify an attack that caused the catas trophic loss of civilian life. Rather, 
the U nited States would have to provide evidence that the destruction of 
an adversary's nuclear facilities was the only way to preven t a devastating 
nuclear attack against its forces or population or those of an ally. The 
international community probab ly would find anything less than this 
justification insufficient to satisfy the proportionality requirement. 
Con clusion s Drawn from the Laws of War 
Attacks against facil ities containing nuclear material during a time of 
armed conflict must meet stringent conditions to satisfy the requirements 
of the laws of war. Although the United States has not ratified Protocol I,  
and therefore is not bound by its  terms, the requirements of customary 
international law pose challenging obstacles to the use of armed force 
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against a facility containing fissionable material. If the United States 
desires to target such facilities, it should develop methods that would 
prevent the release of large amounts of radioactive fallout that could 
produce enormous environmental destruction and severe civilian casual­
ties. Without such methods, the United States may have to attack support 
facilities and weapon delivery systems to accomplish its military ob jectives. 
The legal risks associated with a release of radioactive material may be too 
great to attempt attacks on a facility containing nuclear material during a 
time a war. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
C
OUNTER-PROLIFERATION should become a key element in a compre­
hensive U.S .  nonprol iferation strategy. As p art of this strategy, U.S.  
policy makers must prepare for the selective application of counter-prolif­
eration in its most aggressive forms. Whi le it may be hoped that such an 
application will prove unnecessary, it is in the interests of the Uni ted S tates 
to have this option available. 
While the NYf and traditional nonproliferation schemes have worked 
reasonably well in containing the spread of nuclear weapons, economic and 
political pressures are building that are making it more difficult for the 
nonproliferation regime to survive. These pressures will  continue to build 
even though the NYf was extended in 1 995 for an indefinite period. The 
pressures on th e nonproliferation regime include the spread of sophisti ­
cated technology applicable in both the civilian and military spheres; the 
dissolution of the Soviet  Union, which has released into the global market 
both human expertise and poorly controlled fissionable material for use by 
potential proliferants; the limited resources and effectiveness of the IAEA ; 
the limited scope of the language of the NYf; and the ongoing ambitions 
of a few states which are motivated for a vari ety of reasons to acquire a 
nuclear devi ce. 
In this environment, a time may arise when, despi te i ts best efforts, the 
Uni ted States confronts a nation wi th adverse interests that is  on the verge 
of obtaining a nuclear weapon. For example, given U.S. strategic interests 
in the Persian Gulf region and Iran's current antipathy toward the United 
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States, U.S. policy makers may be unwilling to tolerate an Iran armed with 
nuclear weapons. The present nonproliferation regime is designed to avoid 
this scenario; however, that regime might fail, and the United States must 
have options, including military options, to address this possibility. 
The adoption of a counter-proliferation strategy fills that need. This 
paper has attempted to present the international legal challenges that the 
United S tates would face in the application of the counter-proliferation 
option. U.S. policy makers must recognize that the international legality 
of the application of counter-proliferation in its interdiction form is highly 
questionable under the present interpretations of intemational law and 
may jeopardize the position of the United States within the international 
community. Whether or not a norm prohibiting the proliferation of nu­
clear weapons may exist, particular ly for signatories of the NPT, no accepted 
mechanism involving the application of force exists to enforce that norm. 
A U.S. counter-proliferation strategy could fill this void; however, the 
introduction of the strategy will produce costs, including exposing the 
United States to allegations of an intentional violation of international law . 
Application of the strategy would endanger the viability of the NPT, 
especially if the nation subj ect to the strike were an NPT member and 
evidence of its nuclear ambitions were less than unquestion able, perhaps 
even admitted. 
Despite these legal barriers, the United States should pursue the 
counter-proliferation strategy. Conceivably, the United States might seek 
to expend diplomatic capital in an attempt to legitimize the application of 
forceful counter-proliferation. Besides the fact that this effort would meet 
with resistance, such a ch ange could be undesirable for the United States, 
because if th e application offorceful counter-proliferation becomes accept­
able wi thin the international community, it would become available to 
states other than the Uni ted States. In such an environment, some nations 
might undertake a counter-proliferation strike that would be legitimate in 
the eyes of international community but adverse to U.S. interests. The 
United States would not want an international legal environment in which 
an Indian counter-proliferation strike against Pakistan, for example, were 
legitimate. Furthermore, other states might use counter-proliferation as a 
shield to justify otherwise illegitimate attacks . 
Barring the establishment of a new norm permitting counter-proliferation 
strikes in their most aggressive form, any U.S. strike in a peacetime setting 
almost certainly would violate the current tenets of international law. Such a 
strike, depending upon its consequences, also might violate the laws of armed 
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conflict during war. While this would be unfortunate, the United States 
should not sacrifice a potentially valuable strategic tool that could stem 
proliferation and enhance U.S.  national security simply to maintain perfect 
adherence to a set of international legal rules that in many ways may have 
become outdated. Such blind adherence would place concerns about the 
nation's stature within the international community above all other na­
tional security interests.
204 Abandoning the counter-proliferation option 
simply to conform to outdated international standards would be unwise. 
In ternational concerns have changed dramatically since the conclusion 
of the Cold War. No longer must the United S tates focus on containing the 
Soviet threat at the expense of other national securi ty interests. Rather, this 
nation mus t fashion a modern security policy tha t addresses the dangers 
of the post-Cold War era. A strategy of counter-proliferation should play a 
part in  this scheme; however, those who develop this policy must compre­
hend both i ts legal and poli tical implications. Failure to do so will ensure 
that the adoption of a strategy of counter-proliferation not only will violate 
the stipulations of international law but also migh t sacrifice the nonprolif­
eration regime and jeopardize the status of th e U nited States within the 
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